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IAbstract
The current study examined how children's event representations changed with increasing
experience with an event. There were 81 children (40 4-to-5-year-olds, and 41 7-to-8-year-olds)
who participated in either 2 (n = 41) or 4 (n = 40) repeated event sessions, which consisted of
activities such as playing a counting game, and/or doing a puzzle. Event sessions included three
different item types; variable items (which changed at every occurrence), fixed items (which
stayed constant throughout the event), and new items (which only occurred once throughout the
series). Children were interviewed 5-7- days following their last event session using free-recall,
as well as specific questioning phases (where they were asked about every item in the series).
Increasing experience aided in recalling more fixed items, but was detrimental to recall of
variable and new items. Older children had a better ability to recall fixed and variable items, but
not necessarily new items than younger children. Results are discussed with reference to script
and fuzzy trace theories, as well as the source-monitoring framework.
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1Age and Amount of Experience on Children's Representations of Repeated Events
Many events that children experience occur more than once, such as swimming lessons or
going on vacations, and some children experience less positive events such as repeated abuse.
Children's memories for single experiences are qualitatively different from their memories for
repeated experiences (see Roberts & Powell, 2001, for a review). Compared to children who
experience an event multiple times, children who experience a single event generally have good
memories of the details of the event (Farrar & Goodman, 1992), and older children are more
accurate in single event recall than younger children (Powell, Roberts, Ceci, & Hembrooke,
1999). Children who experience multiple events do not have problems recalling details which do
not change across sessions, but struggle when recalling details that vary in each session, as they
tend to get confused between the different occurrences (Powell et. al., 1999).
Such confusions can clearly have implications on the autobiographical memories that
children retain of their lives. In other circumstances, such as cases of child abuse when the
victims' accounts are of primary importance in order for any prosecution to occur (Lamb et al.,
1 997), these confusions can be devastating. Problematically, children who have been abused on
multiple occasions may be required to particularize; to identify, distinguish and describe one
specific incident of repeated abuse in court proceedings (S v. R, 1989, as cited in Powell &
Thomson, 2003). These specific details may include the time, date, specific actions performed by
the perpetrator, or any other unique contextual details. Without such information, specific
charges cannot be laid (Powell, Roberts & Guadagno, 2007), and the accused may be unable to
refute the allegations (Guadagno, Powell, & Wright, 2006). Identifying, labelling and describing
one specific instance of a repeated event with enough detail and accuracy is a difficult task for
2most children (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Hudson, 1990; Lindsay, Johnson & Kwan, 1991;
Powell et. al., 1999; Powell & Thomson, 1996). This effect is especially evident with younger
children, whose understanding of time, and ability to temporally sequence events is developing
(Friedman, 1993). These issues have obvious practical significance, especially in forensic
settings. It is important to examine how children mentally represent events they encounter
repeatedly, and how these representations change with increasing experience, in order to provide
forensic interviewers with practical advice on how to elicit accurate and more detailed accounts
of one specific instance of abuse from child witnesses.
Goals of Current Study
In previous research, children's memories for one instance of a repeated event (usually
the last instance) have been studied (e.g., Connolly & Price, 2006; Roberts & Powell, 2007). The
goal of the current study was to examine how children's event representations changed with
increasing experience with an event. We examined the narratives of 4-to-5- and 7-to-8-year-old
children who experienced an event two or four times. We looked at the raw numbers of
information reported (relevant to the event), accuracy, as well as children's abilities to nominate
and label a specific occurrence. The event incorporated a number of different variations and
deviations in each occurrence; thus there were a number of unique features in each occurrence
that could later be used by both the child and interviewer in order to distinguish or label the
occurrence at the time of the interview. This is different from previous research which has
examined children's memories for one deviation episode (nominated by the interviewers) of
groups of children who experienced an event on two or four occasions (Farrar & Goodman,
1992; Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 1999). For example, much of the previous research has asked
3children to talk about one occurrence, nominated by the interviewer, such as 'the last time', or
'the time you wore a leaf badge'; problematically, the children may not even remember the last
time (or know what that term means), or they may not remember the badge detail at all. Due to
the variations and deviations in each occurrence, the present study allowed each child to
nominate and label any one of the occurrences that they remembered best, rather than having
only one deviation episode, later nominated by the interviewer (Farrar & Goodman, Farrar &
Boyer-Pennington, 1999), which may not be the most memorable instance for the child. Further,
the present study is more ecologically valid than much of previous research in the field, as there
are a number of details which change in every occurrence of any repeated event, be it learning to
play different sports in gym class, to having different team members. Similarly, repeated abuse
may occur in different places, or at different times of the day.
First, the repeated events paradigm and the methodology will be reviewed, followed by
three main theories which help explain and predict children's memories for repeated events:
Script theory (Abelson, 1981; Hudson et al., 1992), The Schema Confirmation-Deployment
Model (Farrar & Goodman, 1992) with a focus on recall of typical vs. atypical information
(Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 1999), Fuzzy Trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998; Brainerd &
Reyna, 2004; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), as well as the Source-Monitoring Framework (Lindsay,
Johnson, & Kwon, 1991; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). In conclusion, the specific
hypotheses of the current study will be outlined.
The Repeated Events Paradigm
After multiple experiences with an event, fixed items (which stay the same in all
occurrences; e.g., the children get introduced to a fox every time) are well recalled by children,
4compared to single event recall (Hudson, 1990; Connolly & Lindsay, 2001). Alternately,
variable items (which change in every occurrence; e.g., the leader wears a different coloured
cloak every time) are often poorly recalled, as the children get confused between the
occurrences, and recall items from the other occurrences not in question. These are known as
internal intrusion errors, and are the most common type of errors found in children's repeated
event recall (Powell et. al., 1999). For full methodological details and item types of the current
study, refer to table 1 .
In addition to usingfixed and variable items, the current design also incorporated new
items (see new item row of Table 1); these items only happened in one occurrence across the
series (e.g., the children played with airport magnets the first time only, and counted frogs only
in the second time etc.). These items are unique to only one occurrence of the event, and children
may tag these unique details in order to help them identify, distinguish and label one specific
occurrence later on. Children have been found to be generally more accurate in their recall of
new items than variable items, suggesting an enhanced ability to recall unique aspects of an
occurrence of a repeated event versus constant, albeit varying, aspects of an event (Brubacher,
Glisic, Roberts, & Powell, in press).
While much of the previous repeated-events research has examined items that vary in
each occurrence (Powell et al., 1999), or items which vary in some occurrences (Powell &
Thomson, 1996), it has not included deviations, per se; that is, items which only happen one
time. On the contrary, Farrar and Goodman's (1992) work did include a deviation episode, but
there was no variation; that is, the children experienced a standard (or constant) event one, two or
three times (which was exactly the same every time), and then a deviation episode (which was
5different than the standard event). Importantly, this work will tie all of the previous research
together as it incorporated constants (fixed items), variations (variable items), as well as
deviations (new items) in each occurrence of the event. Next, the discussion will focus on a
theory with relevance to the repeated events paradigm and recall of constants, variations and
deviations: script theory.
Script Theory
The first theory to be reviewed is script theory, which has its basis in schema theories.
Schemas are generic knowledge structures which help us to organise our world; they contain
certain components or relationships that normally occur within that schema (Graesser, Gordon,
& Sawyer, 1979; Abelson, 1981). A script is a schema for an event that a person has repeatedly
experienced. A classic example is the restaurant script; there is a specific sequence that happens
every time one goes to a restaurant, which includes first being seated, then ordering your food,
eating it and then paying the bill. This script will eventually become stronger the more times that
one experiences dining at a restaurant. Further, with increasing experience with an event, the
more adaptable the script gets; it could begin to include the different foods you ate at any
particular time. Therefore, eating an entree is considered a part of the general event
representation (it almost always happens when one goes to a restaurant), with a number of
specific slots or lists of the different variations experienced at different times (such as ordering
steak, chicken, or a salad). Thus, scripts are spatially-temporally organized representations of an
event in memory (Hudson et al., 1992).
When children experience a repeated event, they similarly develop scripts for their
experiences; details that are common to all of the occurrences become a part of the general event
6representation and they use these to help guide their recall of the event (Hudson et al., 1992).
With increasing experience with an event, the script begins to allow for variations to be noted.
When children try to recall the event, they now face the issue of deciding which variation
happened at which time (e.g., there were four different cloaks: a red, blue, green and yellow one,
but which one happened the second time?). The next discussion will focus on a developmental
script theory known as the schema confirmation-deployment model, which attempts to explain
how age and amount of repetition may influence the accuracy of children's recall of one specific
occurrence of a repeated event.
The Schema Confirmation-Deployment Model. This model was derived from script
theory; it asserts that a schema is established after repetition of an event (Farrar & Goodman,
1992). Once a basic schema is established, information consistent with the schema is noted and
the schema gets confirmed. During the schema-confirmation phase, children allocate attention to
predictable information (e.g., we always get a button badge, and then put together a puzzle), as it
is necessary to develop the script. When children who are in schema-confirmation are faced with
variations or deviations (e.g., the cloak is a different colour every time or they play with airport
magnets only in the first day), their attention is still focused on building a script, thus these
variations and deviations may not be noticed, or they may be incorporated into the general script
representation. This would make it more difficult to accurately form an episodic memory for one
specific episode (i.e., memories of details particular to that specific occurrence of the event).
Once a fully formed script for an event is established, however, there is less of a need to attend to
predictable, scripted information. Now, more attention can be allocated to unpredictable
deviations or variations in the script (referred to as schema-deployment), which should produce
more accurate episodic memories.
7Farrar and Goodman (1992) had children participate in an event 1, 2, or 4 times. The 2-
session group experienced a 'standard' visit first, followed by a 'deviation' visit. The 4-session
group experienced the standard visit 3 times (each standard occurrence was identical), followed
by the 'deviation' visit (the deviation was different from the standard visit). For example, the 4-
session group played at a puppet table (an item) and a frog jumped over a fence {instantiations of
the puppet table item) in the first 3 occurrences (standard visits), and then with a turtle and a pig
crawling under a bridge (different instantiations of the puppet table item) in the last occurrence
(the deviation episode). The researchers found that younger children (4-year-olds) take longer
to build up scripts (confirm their schémas) than older children (7-year-olds), and that those with
more experience with an event (4 visits), had better episodic recall than those with less
experience (2 visits). An issue with these findings is that the standard visit was always the same,
and the deviation visit always occurred last. It is not clear whether children were recalling a
script per se, that is, a general event representation, or whether they simply remembered the
fixed details because they were so rehearsed. Also note that one variation of an item that has
been fixed for the majority of sessions is quite different to an item that varies constantly. In the
latter case, a generic representation would be the overall item (e.g., see a fox each time), whereas
a variation would be more specific (e.g., leader wears a different cloak every time). Thus, script
theories are useful but not sufficient to explain the patterns found in children's memories of
repeated events; theories of memories of repeated events must include some mechanism of
which details are most likely to be confused.
Memory for typical vs. atypical details. The script pointer + tag hypothesis suggests
one such mechanism, but was developed to explain adult script memory. This hypothesis asserts
that conceptual representations of scripted events consist of a 'pointer' to the general script as a
8whole, as well as 'tags' for actions or items which are not typical of the generic script (Graesser
et al, 1979). When an activity is encountered, a memory representation is constructed which has
a 'pointer' (a memory link) to the best generic script for the activity, along with 'tags' for
episodic details which are inconsistent or atypical to the script (Graesser et al., 1979). The
phenomenon that memory for atypical details, or details not consistent with the script is better
than memory for typical details, or those consistent with the script is known as the consistency
effect or the typicality effect (Roberts & Powell, 2006).
Some recent research has been conducted on children's memories for typical versus
atypical information (Davidson & Hoe, 1993; Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 1999). Davidson and
Hoe (1993) found that schema inconsistent (atypical) details in stories were better recalled than
schema consistent (typical) details. Children were read stories of a scripted event, which had
highly typical scripted details (e.g., having a shopping cart), as well as two types of atypical
details: script consistent and plausible details (e.g., a man put doggie treats in a shopping cart),
and script inconsistent, implausible details (e.g., a lion was looking up at the carrots). In recall,
children recalled more atypical (plausible and implausible), than typical (highly scripted) details,
and were better at recalling implausible over plausible atypical information. An issue to be noted
is that the children were asked to recall the story one day later; a one day delay may not be very
indicative of long term memory processes; with a one or two week delay, children could actually
have mentioned more of the typical scripted information. Also, hearing a story may not have the
same amount of impact on memory as participating in an event. Finally, the implausible events
were not only atypical, but quite fantastical in nature, which is why they may have been well
recalled.
9The current research examined how this pattern of results about children's memory
development was affected by increasing experience with an event, incorporating a longer delay
to interview, as well as having less fantastical atypical elements. The variable items in our
design (those that changed in every occurrence) may be likened to typical details, as they are
consistent with the script (the cloak is there every time; it just changes colour), and thus would be
stored along with all of the other characteristics of the event script as a whole, whereas new
items (only happen once within the series) may be likened to atypical details, or deviations, as
they are not consistent with the script, and thus are 'tagged' as unique and stored as a separate
unit in memory. When a child in their fourth event session is faced with a new item (a pink hearts
bookmark), which only appears in the fourth session (refer to Table 1 for item frequency details
of the current study), and a variable item (a yellow cloak) which has been seen in a different
form in the past three sessions (blue, red and green cloaks), the pink hearts bookmark will be
'tagged' as a separate unit in memory, whereas the yellow cloak will be amalgamated into the
script representation with all of the other script characteristics (which will include the different
variations of the cloak and all the other activities belonging to the script). According to the
consistency effect, a child is more likely to recall the pink hearts bookmark as correctly
belonging to the last occurrence, as it has its own representation or 'tag' in memory, than the
yellow cloak, as the cloak detail was stored along with all of the other details characteristic of the
script, which include the other variations of the cloak (blue, red and green). Thus, the yellow
cloak itself may not stand out as much in episodic memory. If we can find that children, much
like adults, are capable of recalling deviations or unique aspects of specific episodes of similar
events, as well as how increased experience affects this ability, then we can begin to incorporate
these ideas into educational and forensic settings.
10
Farrar and Boyer-Pennington (1999) were interested in examining typical and atypical
changes of a scripted event in order to incorporate this into the schema confirmation-deployment
model. Older children (7-year-olds) accurately remembered both typical and atypical changes
more than younger children did (4-year-olds), and thus, were said to be in schema-deployment.
Interestingly, the 4-year-olds with more experience with the event were more accurate in
recalling atypical, over typical information and were said to still be in schema-confirmation.
Furthermore, when the event was simplified for the 4-year-old group (in a second experiment),
the researchers found that they too were able to form distinct memories for both typical and
atypical changes, and enter into schema-deployment. The authors asserted that the developmental
differences children have shown in past studies are not inevitable, but may be attenuated under
certain conditions (in this case, a simplification of the standard event). This latter assertion is
questionable, as the researchers only simplified and shortened the event for the younger age
group, as well as only shortening and simplifying the 'standard' episode(s), while leaving the
'deviation' episode unchanged. The Farrar and Boyer-Pennington (1999) study focused on a
single deviation occurrence but past research has shown that children tend to be highly confused
when they experience details that vary every time they experience a scripted event (Connolly &
Lindsay, 2001; Powell et al., 1999).
The current study is different than previous research as our design incorporated constants
(fixed items, which occur at every session, in exactly the same form; e.g., the children saw the
same fox every time), variations, or typical details (variable items, which occurred at every
session, but in a slightly different form; e.g., the leader wore a different coloured cloak every
time), as well as deviations, or atypical details (new items, which only happened in one session;
11
e.g., the leader had a pink hearts bookmark only in the last time). Table 1 provides definitions of
the different item frequency types with examples of each.
This design is more representative of a real life repeated event (such as playing soccer),
which includes constants (you always wear your uniform), variations (you play a different team
every game), as well as unique features, or deviations (your grandpa came to one of your games,
or one of your team mates broke their arm). Importantly, the children in this study were asked to
nominate the occurrence they remembered best, instead of relying on the assumption that the
child would remember a specific occurrence of the interviewer's choosing (as much of previous
research has relied on this assumption by having the interviewers simply tell the children "I want
you to tell me about the last time" or "tell me about the time you wore the leaf badge"). Each
child was given a chance to come up with their own unique label, with prompts from the
interviewers. The interviewer provided the label only if all of the previous prompts did not work.
In summary, script theory is useful in explaining how children remember details on a
general script level (details or activities that happen repeatedly). It fails to account for the
specific types of errors in children's recall (internal intrusion errors), as it does not give an
explanation of why children make these errors. The children in schema-confirmation may simply
overlook (and not encode) variations and deviations, or may absorb them into the general script
(not store, or tag the information separately). Also, the age differences (or lack thereof) need to
be replicated using a more controlled experiment, by incorporating variations and deviations in
every occurrence of the event. Additionally, the events must be equal in length for all of the age
and repetition groups. Further , research needs to distinguish between generic script information
covering the general structure of the event (i.e., we meet an animal, and then she puts on a cloak,
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and then we play a counting game at the end), and more specific episodic recall which includes:
details that remain the same in all occurrences (fixed items; we meet a fox in the first day, and
every day), details which change at every occurrence (variable items; she wore a blue cloak the
first time, and a red cloak the second time), as well as unique details, or deviations (new items;
the first day was the only time we played with airport magnets). We must examine how children
recall the structure, variability, deviations as well as constancy of events, in order to come up
with a comprehensive theory on how children learn to represent events in their memories, at
what point these representations change, and how they change. The next discussion will focus on
another relevant theory to the current study: Fuzzy trace theory, which makes better predictions
as to why children tend to make the errors they do.
Fuzzy-Trace Theory
The second theory which is relevant to the current research is fuzzy trace theory; a dual
processing model which posits that memories are encoded as gist and verbatim traces (Reyna &
Brainerd, 1995). Verbatim traces are those of a target's exact form (e.g., it was a red cloak);
while gist traces involve semantic relations as well as other elaborative information about the
target and the event as a whole (e.g. first she put some sort of cloak on). Gist traces can thus be
compared to scripts, where gist representations (leader wearing a cloak), can hold slots of a
number of gist-consistent verbatim traces (blue, red, or yellow cloak).
Repetition leads to strong traces, and verbatim traces decay much faster than gist traces.
Younger children can recall verbatim details of an item with repeated experience with that item,
but have poorer verbatim traces of items only encountered once (Brainerd & Reyna, 2004). It
also takes younger children longer to develop gist traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998; Brainerd &
13
Reyna, 2004), which is consistent with Farrar and Goodman's (1992) assertions that it takes
younger children longer to develop a script.
When a child is accurate in recalling an item which occurred in a specific occurrence, it is
because they have recalled the correct verbatim form of the target (e.g., recalling a red cloak,
when it did occur in that session), whereas an internal intrusion error is when the child recalls an
incorrect verbatim form because of a reliance on strong gist traces. An example of this would be
if the child recalled a blue cloak as happening in that occurrence, when it was actually the red
cloak. This is because the blue cloak is a gist-consistent verbatim detail. The child in this case
was not able to correctly reject the incorrect verbatim detail (blue cloak) of a different
occurrence, due to a strong reliance on the gist representation. Repetition strengthens the
verbatim traces of fixed details, and strengthens the gist representations of variable details
(Roberts & Powell, 2007). Withfixed items, the gist representations are said to be weak, because
the same detail is presented each time. With variable items, the details change every time while
being gist-consistent with each other, and thus, a strong gist representation should eventually
result in less accurate recall.
While fuzzy-trace is helpful in explaining why younger children are less capable of
accurate recall than older children, an issue is raised with the idea that as age increases, so does
the ability to form gist representations, and since recall errors are based on a reliance on strong
gist representations (Brainerd & Reyna, 2004), older children should be less accurate than
younger children, which previous research on repeated events does not support (Farrar &
Goodman, 1992; Powell & Thomson, 1996). Next, the discussion will focus on a third
14
framework, which examines the processes which occur at retrieval, rather than encoding: the
source-monitoring framework.
The Source-Monitoring Framework
The last theory to be discussed is the Source-Monitoring Framework, which posits that
recalling an instance of a repeated event includes two separate components: the content details
(e.g., yellow cloak) as well as the source of those details. In repeated events, one example of a
source is the temporal source of the content detail within the series (e.g., she wore a yellow cloak
on the last day) (Powell, Roberts, Thomson & Ceci, 2007). The accuracy of remembering a
specific incident, according to this framework, is determined during the process of remembering,
or at the retrieval stage, and not at encoding (like fuzzy-trace would predict) (Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). The source decision is based on how much perceptual, contextual,
sensory, affective, and semantic information we have about a target, how vivid this information
is, and the amount of cognitive operations (such as reflections) associated with the memory
(Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991). A recollection which is rich in the amount, as well as
vividness of perceptual detail (such as recalling how the hand sanitizer smelled), with few
indications of cognitive operations, is usually identified as a real life event, where recollections
that are not perceptually vivid, lack detail, and include heavy cognitive operations, are identified
as imagined events (Lindsay et al., 1991). Similarly, it can be noted that atypical deviations (or
new items) may be more vivid than the routine or typical variations {variable items), and thus,
these items may actually be more accurately attributed to the correct source.
When children attempt to recall one specific instance of a repeated event, they have to
refer back to the source or origin ofthat memory, and research has shown that highly similar
15
sources are much more difficult to distinguish than less similar sources, especially with younger
children (Lindsay et al., 1991; Roberts & Blades, 1999), and repeated events can be said to be
perceptually similar, which is why source-monitoring errors arise. For instance, when trying to
think about which cloak was worn by the leader on the third day, the child may have an intact
memory of all the content details; that is, they saw four different colours of cloaks, but the
temporal source of which cloak was worn in which occurrence may not be well recalled as the
occurrences or sources are highly similar, and therefore difficult to distinguish. Thus, the
observed pattern of internal intrusion errors in repeated-event research is easily explained by the
source-monitoring framework.
When children confuse events, there is a systematic pattern to their confusions. For
instance, Powell and Thomson (1997) had 4-to 5-and 6-to-8-year-old children participate in a
repeated event 6 times; the event had the same underlying structure, but the content details varied
each time (e.g., the children sat on something every day, but each day it was something
different). The children were interviewed about the final occurrence of the event at a 1- or 6-
week delay. The results indicate that at the 1-week delay, there was a relatively high proportion
of details mentioned which were from the last session, and if the children were incorrect, they
were more likely to pull out an incorrect detail from a session closer to the last session (such as
the fourth or fifth session), rather than a sessionfurther away from the last session (such as the
first or second session). Conversely, at the 6-week delay, the incorrect details were more evenly
distributed across the sessions; that is, the children were just as likely to confuse the final session
with the second, third, or fifth sessions. Additionally, younger children's errors tended to be
farther away than the older children, irrespective of the retention interval. It could be stated that
this inability to remember at the 6-week delay could have been simply due to forgetting of the
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content details, so the authors conducted a second study with the exact same design, but the
children were asked to report all of the details they remembered from the event(s) (irrespective
of the session they occurred in), and then asked to decide which ones happened in the final
session, as a way to separate memory for content vs. temporal sources. It was found that while
both content and temporal source information declines with time, the effect seems to be more
pronounced with the temporal source information; that is, the children may remember that they
sat on a blue mat at some point but fail to have a temporal source of when in the series they
actually sat on the blue mat. The current study examined these distance effects; it looked at how
children's memories and representations changed during the course of the event, by comparing
the recall of those in the 2-session vs. those in the 4-session groups.
Developmental differences in the ability to monitor sources have been evident in past
research. Drummey and Newcombe (2002) used a fictitious facts paradigm, in which they taught
children a number of facts, and tested their knowledge as well as the source of how they learned
these facts (a puppet or experimenter) one week later. They found that 4-year-old children were
less capable of monitoring their sources correctly than were 6- and 8-year-old children. In fact,
the authors found that the 4-year-olds were not only forgetting the sources, but were showing
signs of source amnesia; they had completely forgotten the context of the event, and were
attributing source to extra experimental factors (such as their moms or teachers, instead of the
experimenters or puppets). The authors posit that there might be more mechanisms involved in
source monitoring than just at the retrieval process.
More recently, binding processes have been implicated as the possible mechanisms
which underlie source-monitoring decisions. Binding is the joining of particular features to form
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a more complex memory, and this occurs during encoding (Kovacs & Newcombe, 2006). When
someone is introduced to a person for the first time, they may remember the name or the specific
features of the face ofthat person (simpler stimuli); additionally, it is beneficial to note the
relation between that person's name and the features of their face, in order to recognize them at a
later meeting (Sluzenski, Newcombe, & Kovacs, 2006). Thus, binding is the ability to note the
relations between stimuli, during initial encoding of those stimuli. Children's ability to remember
isolated parts of pictures, as well as their memory for the combinations of the parts was tested
(Sluzenski et al., 2006). The researchers found that improvements in recall of combinations
increased between 4- and 6years of age, but found no age-related improvements for the isolated
parts. Further, the researchers examined children's performance on the combination task with
free recall of an episodic event. Results showed a positive relationship between performance on
the combination task and performance on an episodic memory task, suggesting that the ability to
bind sources at the encoding stage may be essential in the development of source-monitoring
ability. Thus, source monitoring may actually begin at encoding (through binding processes),
and continue at retrieval (when the source decision is finally made).
In sum, the source-monitoring framework states that source decisions are made at the
retrieval stage, and also makes some predictions about younger children being less capable of
monitoring their sources than older children. It also predicts that distinct (unique) information be
more accurately recalled than routine information (Johnson et al., 1993). With new research on
binding processes as possible mechanisms underlying source decisions, the source-monitoring
framework may be the framework with the clearest predictions and explanations as to why
children make source errors. With source decisions being made at the retrieval stage, it may also
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be the most fruitful premise for practical implications, as there might be ways to train children to
monitor their sources better.
In general, the three theories outlined previously all have elements which are useful when
examining children's memories for repeated events. Script theories explain how information is
remembered on a general, or structural level, but fail to make predictions or explanations as to
why specific internal intrusion errors arise; children who are confirming their scripts may simply
overlook variations or deviations (and not even encode the information) due to a larger amount
of resources being allocated to the routine aspects of the episodes, or they may not store the
information properly (by not attributing the variation or deviation to a specific episode, but rather
as a list of possibilities). Fuzzy trace theory is more effective at predicting why children make
the errors that they do; especially younger children, whose verbatim traces decay faster than that
of older children, but it still does not give any indication as to how to help reduce errors in recall.
Conversely, if source decisions are to be made at retrieval, there is hope that there may be
training procedures which might help children at attributing their sources correctly, but research
has not established a clear answer to this question. A more complete theory is needed; one
which incorporates when and how children learn a general event structure, that makes solid
predictions about errors (and why they happen). Finally, it should establish methods on how to
elicit more accurate recall from children. In order to accomplish this, children's event
representations of a new, scripted event were examined. The current study examined age and
repetition effects on the accuracy of children's memories; specifically looking at which types of
errors children systematically made when examining details that remained constant, details that
varied, and details that were unique, or deviated from the script. How children recalled the
general structure of an event was also examined, and whether this changed as a function of age,
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as well as experience with the event. The next discussion will focus on the hypotheses of the
current study as well as the predictions according to each theory.
Hypotheses
Labelling. For labelling analyses, we were interested in examining whether age and
repetition condition affected the child's ability to nominate and identify their own unique label,
and the number of interviewer prompts it took for them to do so.
The Schema Conformation-Deployment Model would predict older children are more
likely to come up with their own unique label, and need fewer interviewer prompts than younger
children. They confirm and deploy their schémas faster, and thus retain variations and deviations
more so than younger children, which should make them more likely to come up with their own
unique labels (identifiers, memory cues) for each occurrence. If they are better at recalling
unique details of a certain session, it should also be easier for them to use that unique detail to
distinguish that occurrence from all the rest, and label it uniquely.
The Schema Confirmation-Deployment Model would also predict that the 4-session
group will be more likely to come up with a unique label than the 2-session group (due to more
experience with the event; by the fourth session, the children should enter into deployment, and
be retaining deviations and variations of each occurrence). The 2-session group will still be
confirming their schémas. Older children also have a better knowledge of the language, both its
meaning, and structure, and have a better knowledge of time, time sequencing, as well as the use
of temporal labels (e.g., Friedman & Lyon, 2005).
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Fuzzy Trace Theory would predict a similar pattern of results, due to older children's
verbatim traces lasting longer than those of the younger children. Further, The Source-
Monitoring Framework would also predict this age difference; as older children are much better
at binding their sources (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Sluzenski et al., 2006); they are more
likely to bind together the different details of each occurrence, be able to note the differences
between occurrences, and use this information in order to identify and label an occurrence in a
unique way which differentiates it from the others.
In the current study, it was predicted that older children would be significantly more
likely come up with their own unique label, need fewer interviewer prompts to do so, and be less
likely to need an interviewer label than younger children (Hypothesis 1).
Accuracy. The current study examined whether age, repetition condition, and item
frequency type had an effect on children's accuracy of recall of one specific occurrence of the
repeated event. The Schema Confirmation-Deployment Model, Fuzzy Trace Theory and The
Source-Monitoring Framework would all predict that children in all of the age groups and
repetition conditions would be very accurate in recall ??fixed items, as these items were the
exact same in every occurrence, and there is not any reason for confusion between them. If the
children saw a fox in every occurrence, they are highly likely to remember it and recall it
correctly later on; they have nothing to confuse it with, as it was there in the exact same form
every time. These items were used in order to add a level of constancy to the event, and to assist
children in building up a script. Thus, no significant age or repetition condition differences on
accuracy are predicted forfixed details.
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The Schema Confirmation-Deployment Model would predict that the 4-session group
would have better recall of both the atypical deviations (new items), and typical variations
(variable items) than the 2-sesion group, as their increased experience would make it more likely
that they would be in the schema-deployment phase, and thus remember both deviations and
variations. The 2-session group will still be confirming their schémas, and if anything, they could
be more accurate recalling the atypical deviations (new details) better than typical variations
(variable details) as the most atypical, unique details are said to be encoded earlier and more
accurately recalled than variable, but typical details. The Schema Confirmation-Deployment
Model would also predict the younger children in the 2-session group to be much less accurate
than older children in the 2-session group as it takes the former longer to confirm their schema,
This difference should be smaller for the 4-session group (as the younger children should benefit
from repetition, and confirm their schémas).
Interestingly, older children develop gist traces more quickly according to Fuzzy Trace
Theory, and this can actually cause them problems in recalling variable items. Due to the
stronger gist trace, they have a large number of gist-consistent verbatim details of each variable
item type to choose from, and thus might result in less accurate recall. This would be opposite of
what the script confirmation-deployment model would suggest (as repetition increases, so does
level of script development, and ability to recall variations correctly). Fuzzy Trace Theory
would also predict that since new items are experienced only once, they would be poorly recalled
as there would be no strong verbatim traces or gist traces that would be encoded, due to lack of
repetition.
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It has been shown that younger children are worse at binding and monitoring their
sources than older children are (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Sluzenski et al., 2006). Thus,
The Source-Monitoring Framework would predict that older children, due to their more
advanced abilities to bind together different features of one specific session, will also recall
individual occurrences of an event more accurately (e.g., note that the red cloak was on the
second day, and was followed by playing a counting game with frogs etc.). Once one of these
details is retrieved at recall, it may cause the other detail to be retrieved along with it. Younger
children, not yet having this ability to bind different features of one occurrence into one episodic
representation will have less accurate recall.
Further, The Source-Monitoring Framework would posit that the need to come up with a
more complex memory of an event is increased as the frequency of occurrences increases, as it
keeps changing. As each new occurrence is experienced, it is possible that the previous
instantiations of an item will be retrieved, thus strengthening the memory trace ofthat item
(Roberts, Lamb & Sternberg, 1999). For example, a child in their third occurrence of the event
may see the green cloak, recall that this was different than the red cloak they saw last time,
which was different than the blue cloak the first time, leading to a stronger memory trace of the
red or blue cloak, due to it now having been retrieved from their memories. With variable items,
this retrieval could occur as many as three times (in occurrence 2, 3, and 4). The 2-session group
does not get to practice this as many times.
In the current study, it was predicted that older children would report more of, and be
more accurate than younger children with variable and new items (Hypothesis 2 and 3, for each
item type, respectively). They confirm their schémas more quickly; thus, they enter schema-
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deployment faster and are subsequently more capable of noticing both atypical deviations and
typical variations, and storing them as episodic traces (As the Schema Confirmation-Deployment
Model would predict). Older children are also more proficient at source monitoring as well as
binding their sources, and their verbatim details last longer than that of younger children.
The current study predicted the 4-session group to recall more of, and have better recall
of both the typical variations {variable details) (Hypothesis 4), and atypical deviations (new
details) (Hypothesis 5) than the 2-sesion group, as their increased experience would make it
more likely that they would be in the schema-deployment phase, and thus remember both
deviations and variations.
The current study predicted a much larger difference in accuracy for the new and variable
details between the younger and older children in 2-session group (the older children would be
much more accurate), but this age difference in accuracy should be attenuated in the 4-session
group, as the younger children should have more experience with confirming their scripts by the
4l session, and will be slightly more accurate with episodic recall (because they should be
entering schema-deployment). This interaction was predicted for new (Hypothesis 6) as well as
variable items (Hypothesis 7).
Method
Design
Children participated in 2 or 4 occurrences of a scripted event, which involved different
frequencies of items throughout the series (fixed, variable and new). Participants were
interviewed 5-7- days after the last occurrence of the event, and were asked to talk about the time
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they remembered best. Each child was interviewed using a free-recall method, followed by
specific questions about every item in the series. They were then asked to discuss what they
think would happen next time at the Laurier Activities. The design employed was a 2(age: 4-5-
years vs. 7-8- years) ? 2(repeated condition: 2 vs. 4 events) ? 3(item frequency type: fixed vs.
variable vs. new), with the last factor as a repeated measure.
Participants
Originally, 97 children were recruited to take part in the study. The final sample consisted
of 81 children (44 males, 37 females). Of the 16 children who were excluded, 4 missed their
interview, 2 would not speak at the interview, 3 did not have unique labels (interviewer error), 2
did not remember the Laurier Activities at all, 1 child could not be interviewed due to a
developmental disability, and 4 children remembered very little about the Laurier Activities and
gave a large number of external details. There were two counterbalanced item sets, (Group 1 and
Group 2) and children were randomly assigned under the condition that age, gender, and
repeated condition be equated under the two item sets, as best as possible. Table 2 presents the
participant gender information by cell, as well as mean ages, standard deviations and age ranges
(all in months) and is organized by age group, repeated condition, and item set (Group 1 or
Group 2).
Children were recruited through local elementary schools, daycares, and a database of
parents who had expressed interest in participating in developmental research. Only children
whose parents signed informed consent participated. The children also gave oral consent before
each occurrence of the event. The parents of children recruited through the Wilfrid Laurier
family database were compensated $10 for their travel expenses and these children received a
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small toy after each of the sessions. The children recruited through the elementary school system
were compensated by a donation of $50 for each grade, and $5 for each child that participated in
the study (up to a maximum of $400).
Materials
In order to control for item effects, two sets of items (Group 1 and Group 2) were created
for the study. Please refer to Appendix A for the counterbalancing procedure and Appendix B
and C, for item sets (groups) 1 and 2, respectively. Each occurrence of the event consisted of 14
target items with different frequency types: variable items, fixed items, as well as new items.
Table 1 refers to item frequency type examples and definitions.
Of the target items used in the series, six were variable items; for example, the leader
wore a cloak in every occurrence, but the colour of the cloak differed every time. Thus, each
different colour of cloak may be labelled as a different instantiation ofthat item. Another six of
the items in the series werefixed items, which stayed the same at every occurrence; for example,
the children saw the same fox every time. The remaining eight items in the series were the new
items; each of these items appeared only once throughout the series, and each occurrence
included two distinct new items. For example, in the first occurrence (see Table 1), children
played with airport magnets; the magnets were not repeated again in the series, and were used in
the design in order to test children's memories for unique aspects of an occurrence, or atypical
deviations. For a more detailed example of all of the items used in each occurrence of the study
(for Groups 1 and 2), see Appendix A and B. The children in the 2-occurrence condition
participated in the first and second occurrences of each item set only.
26
Procedure
The Event. The event, referred to as the 'Laurier Activities' (LA) was carried out four
times over a two week period by a trained research assistant (RA) to groups of one to five
children (or two times in a one week period for the 2-occurrence group). Each event occurrence
took approximately 20 minutes to complete. Three RAs were responsible for conducting the
events, and an attempt was made so that each RA ran approximately the same number of
children in the study. In groups of five or more children, two RAs were present, with one acting
as the leader of the event, and the other as an assistant.
The scripted event included a number of different activities. In every occurrence, the
leader told the children that they were participating in the 'Laurier Activities', put up an 'L for
Laurier poster', and told the children her name. After this beginning phase of the event, the items
occurred in the order that they are listed in Appendices B and C for Groups 1 and 2, respectively.
For example, in Group 1, occurrence 1, after the leader did the introductory activities, the
children were given cardboard to sit on, and then introduced to Boo the fox and the noisy
penguin. Parents and teachers were instructed not to discuss the activities with the children, or to
inform them that they would eventually be interviewed about their memories for these activities.
The Interview. Following five to seven days after the last occurrence of the LA, children
individually participated in an interview, which was approximately 20- to 30- minutes in length.
First, the children were asked to talk about themselves for approximately five minutes, in order
to build rapport with the interviewer. Following rapport building, the interviewer told the
children that ? wasn't there when you did the Laurier Activities, but I'd really like to know
what happened'. The interviewer waited for the child to spontaneously disclose multiple
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incidents (that the LA happened more than once). Once a child mentioned anything about the LA
happening more than one time, they were asked to confirm what they meant. For instance, if a
child said: 'she always has a cape', the interviewer would then ask 'you said always, what you
mean by always?' The full interview protocol can be found in Appendix D. After the interviewer
established that the child did in fact, disclose multiple incidents (by asking 'did the LA happen
one time or more than one time?'), the child was asked 'how many times did the LA happen?'
Children who did not disclose multiple incidents on their own were asked whether The LA
happened one time or more than one time after a maximum of 5 minutes spent in this section of
the interview. Subsequently, the children were asked to talk about 'the time they remembered
best', and the interviewers used open ended prompts such as 'tell me more', 'what else
happened', 'what happened next/after that', or 'what types of things did you do/play/see/hear the
time you remember best?'
Labelling. The children were encouraged to come up with their own labels for the time
they remembered best. If the child immediately used a clear and unique label to the first "time
you remember best" prompt (one that was easily distinguishable from all of the others for coding
purposes, such as "I remember the first time the best", or "the time with the winter story is the
one I remember best"), that label was used in the remainder of the questioning. For instance, in
occurrence 1 (refer to Table 2), some distinctive instantiations would be: the airport magnets
{new), or the blue cloak (variable) as they only take place in the first occurrence. Fixed
instantiations were not used as labels as they appeared in every occurrence, and did not uniquely
identify any single incidence. Using difixed instantiation as a label would make it impossible to
code for accuracy, and thus render that participant's narrative inadmissible to the analysis.
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If the child straggled with identifying a unique label immediately, they were supported by
the interviewer to create a meaningful label. The interviewers had several prompts to use which
were organized in a 'funner such that the prompts progressed from most to least open-ended. If
the child did not immediately come up with a unique label, they were re-asked the prompt 'tell
me about the time you remembered best'. If they did not label then (or mention a new or variable
instantiation that could be probed further by the interviewer, they were instructed 'Let's give this
time/your favourite time a name. What do you want to call it?' The remainder of the funnel
questions can be found in Appendix D, and were asked in the order they appear, until a unique
label was reached. There were 7 label funnel questions in total.
If the child did not come up with a unique label immediately, or after being asked all of
the funnel questions, the interviewers used either a temporal label (first/last time) or a
distinctive instantiation mentioned by the child as the label (such as a variable or new
instantiation).
In order to allow the child to talk about the time they remembered best, and to maximise
the number of interviews to be coded for accuracy, the interviewers in this study were not blind;
they were aware which instantiations were distinctive to every occurrence. Making sure each
child's label was unique maximized the number of narratives used in the analysis. Forensic
interviewers do not have such information available to them; they do not know what actually
happened when, like the interviewers in this study, but they might have some of this information
at their disposal in the form of physical evidence or other witness accounts and testimony. This
way, they check the child's account against the other sources available to them, much like the
interviewers in this study.
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When the child's free narrative was exhausted, the specific questioning was introduced,
where the child was asked about every item in the series. The questions were asked in random
order and can be found in the Interview Protocol (see Appendix D). If the children gave a 'don't
know' response to a specific question, they were prompted once or twice to 'try and think really
hard about it'. They were prompted after every three 'don't know responses' Following the
specific questioning phase, the children were asked 'what do you think would/will happen next
time you do the LA. Tell me everything you can think ofthat might happen.' As this cannot be
measured for accuracy, this part of the interview was used to gauge how far children's scripts for
the event have developed, but these data will not be included in the current thesis.
Coding. Interviews were audio taped, videotaped and transcribed verbatim for coding
purposes. Each of the items (e.g., "she read us a story") as well as the instantiations of those
items (e.g., boat story, or party story) that the child mentioned were noted, along with the
frequency type (fixed, variable, or new), as well as which occurrence(s) the instantiations
occurred in (1, 2, 3, or 4). There were three categories for free-recall coding: (i) an instantiation
was coded as accurate if it was present in the target occurrence; (ii) an instantiation was coded as
inaccurate or an internal intrusion error if it had been present in one of the other occurrences in
the series, not the target occurrence; (iii) any reference to an item/activity/object that was not
present in any of the occurrences was coded as an external intrusion error. (There were not many
external errors, and so they are not discussed further in the results). Accuracy was computed by
dividing the total number of accurate target instantiations of each frequency type (fixed, variable,
and new) by the total number of target instantiations mentioned ofthat frequency type, to yield
three separate proportional accuracy scores. Further, we also calculated proportions of inaccurate
responses to each item frequency type, in order to yield 3 separate proportions of inaccurate
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scores. Table 3 provides examples of some hypothetical answers and utterances children gave in
free recall and specific questioning phases, and the codes that correspond with such
utterances/answers.
Reliability was assessed by the author training one undergraduate student to code the
narrative recall of the interviews for accuracy; reliability was performed on approximately 12
percent of the transcripts separately for items and instantiations. Cohen's Kappa for reporting
items was .91, and was .97 for instantiations.
Responses to the specific questions were coded as accurate, inaccurate or internal
intrusions, external intrusions, "don't know" responses, and 'other' errors. Other errors included
when a child said that the instantiation did not take place in the occurrence (and it did), or when
the child confused other instantiations that were included in the same occurrence. For instance, if
a child was asked what activity they did to warm up and their response was: 'lie down and listen
to birds' (which is actually an instantiation of the relaxing item in that occurrence), this would be
coded as an 'other' error. Proportionate accuracy scores were created as in free recall, as well as
proportions of inaccurate responses by each item frequency type (these were often the inverse of
proportions of accurate responses unless there were a large number of "don't know", "other",
and "external intrusion errors"). There were not many "other" or "external intrusion" errors to
warrant any further analysis, so they are not discussed further. As the codes are so simple, and do
not take much subjective reasoning, there was no reliability computed for the specific questions.
Disclosure of multiple incidents was coded by counting the number of prompts the
interviewer provided before the child mentioned that the LA happened more than one time, as
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well as whether it was the child who disclosed multiple incidents or whether the interviewer had
to ask.
Each label was categorized as child provided or interviewer provided. The portion of the
interview in which labelling occurred was noted as immediate (after the first interviewer prompt
of "tell me about the time you remember best", these children did not get label funnel), few
prompts needed (the child answered first prompt with something from the LA but needed a few
more prompts until they labelled, these children did not have label funnel), or label funnel (child
did not label spontaneously but needed to be asked label funnel questions).
Ten interviews were used for reliability; reliability for whether it was child or interviewer
that disclosed multiple incidents, and whether it was the child or interviewer that labelled was
perfect. There were no disagreements, thus, Cohen's Kappa was 1. There were also no
disagreements as to which portion of the interview labelling occurred in, and the label funnel
question number. Number of prompts until disclosure of multiple incidents was calculated as a
spearman correlation between two raters, and was found to be .97.
Total amount of information (relevant to the event) was calculated by tallying up number
of raw details (items and instantiations) mentioned. Proportions of the total number of items and
instantiations were calculated by dividing the total number of items/instantiations mentioned by
the child by 14 (the total number of items and instantiations in each occurrence). An item level
statement would be 'we wore a badge' whereas 'we wore a leaf badge' would be an instantiation
level statement.
Results
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Disclosure of Multiple Incidents
Disclosure of multiple incidents was examined by noting whether the child or interviewer
disclosed that the LA happened more than one time. A 2(Age) ? 2(Repeated condition) ? 2(Who
disclosed: child or interviewer) Chi-square analysis revealed an association between age and who
disclosed multiple incidents. Fewer 4-to-5-year-olds disclosed multiple incidents by themselves
than was expected by chance and had the interviewer disclose for them more than expected,
while the 7-to-8-year-olds were the opposite; they disclosed by themselves more and had the
interviewer disclose for them less than expected, ?2(1, TV= 81) = 15.237,/? < .001. The children
did not differ in disclosure depending on repeated condition, ? (I, N= 81) = .001, ? = ns. The
number of interviewer prompts until disclosure was examined in a 2(Age) x 2(Repeated
Condition) ANOVA, which revealed a main effect of age, F(IJl) = 37.33,/? < .001, ??2 = .326.
Younger children (M= 7.13, SD = 3.63) needed more interviewer prompts than older children
(M= 2.95, SD = 1.56). The effect of repeated condition was not significant, F(IJl) = .213, ?
=ns, ??2 = .004, nor was the interaction , F(XJl) = .580,/? = ns, ??2 = .007.
Summary. Whether children disclosed multiple incidents was largely associated with
age. The 4-to-5-year-olds were more likely to not disclose spontaneously and needed the
interviewer to ask them whether the LA occurred more than once, whereas the 7-to-8-year-olds
were more likely to disclose multiple incidents spontaneously without the help of an interviewer.
Labelling
To test the first part of Hypothesis 1 (that older children would be more likely to identify
their own label than younger children), a 2(Age) x 2(Repeated Condition) x 2(Who labelled:
child or interviewer) Chi-square analysis was examined. Contrary to predictions, who labelled
33
was not dependent on age, ?2(1, N= 81) = .998, ? = ns, or repeated condition, ?2(1, N = 81) =
.998, ? = ns. Refer to Table 4 for a list of hypotheses, and whether they were supported.
To test the second part of Hypothesis 1 (older children would need less help and fewer
prompts from the interviewer in order to decide on a label), a 2(Age) x 2(Repeated Condition) x
3(Labelling: immediately, with few prompts, or in labelling funnel) Chi-square analysis on the
labelling section revealed that contrary to the prediction, there was no dependence with age, ?2(2,
N= 81) = 2.308,p = ns, or repeated condition, ?2(2, N= 81) = .217, ? = ns.
To further test Hypothesis 1, using the children that needed the label funnel, a 2(Age) by
2(Repeated Condition) x 3(Who Labelled: child or interviewer) Chi-square analysis revealed that
who labelled was not dependent on age, ?2(1, N= 38) = 2.056,/? = ns, or repeated condition, ?2(1,
N= 38) = .452, ? = ns. A 2(Age) x 2(Repeated Condition) ANOVA on the number of questions
asked in the label funnel until labelling occurred (the maximum was 7) revealed that neither age,
F(1,34) = .280,^ =ns, ??2 = .008, repeated condition, F(1,34) = .21 1, ? =ns, ??2 = .006, or the
interaction were significant , [F(1,34) = .21 1, ? =ns, ??2 = .006].
Overall, 56.8% of the labels used in the study were temporal, and 43.2% were
instantiation level labels (30.9% were of variable, and only 12.3% were of new instantiations). In
order to examine whether repeated experience and age had an effect on the types of labels
children had for their narratives, a 2(Age) x 2(Repeated Condition) x 3(Type of Label: temporal
or instantiation) Chi-square analysis revealed that type of label was not dependent on age, ?2(1, JV
= 81) = 1.050, ? = ns, or repeated condition, ?2(1, N= 81) = .593,/» = ns. Further, a 2(Age) x
2(Repeated Condition) x 2(Instantiation label type: variable or new) Chi-square analysis for only
those children that had chosen their own instantiation level labels was examined; whether the
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instantiation label was new or variable did not depend on repeated condition, ? (1, N = 16) =
.780 ,? = .377; or age, ?2(1, N= 16) = .2.618, ? = .106.
While primacy and recency effects in labelling were not initially predicted, the data were
analyzed in order to examine these effects. A 2(Age) by 2(Repeated Condition) x 3(target label:
first, last, or second and third). Chi-square analysis (on only the children who picked their own
label), revealed that which occurrence was the target label did not depend on repeated condition,
?2(2, N= 45) = 2.984,;? = .225, or age, ?2(2, N = 45) = .385,/? = .825.
Summary. There did not seem to be any relation of age or repeated condition with when
during the interview labelling occurred or who labelled (Thus, no support for Hypothesis 1).
Also, there were no primacy or recency effects found.
Total Amount of Information Reported in Narrative
Children could report details at the item level (e.g., 'we wore a badge') or at the
instantiation level (e.g., 'we wore a.feather badge'). Ns vary because not all children mentioned
each type of item or instantiation in their narrative (i.e., a child who mentioned afixed
instantiation and did not include a new instantiation in their narrative would be included in the
fixed instantiation analysis, but not in the new instantiation analysis).
The total proportion of items in the narrative portion of the interview was calculated as
the total number of items mentioned by the child divided by 14 (the total amount of items in
every occurrence). Similarly, total proportion of instantiations was computed as the total number
of instantiations mentioned divided by 14 (the total number of instantiations in the occurrence).
Total proportion of items and total proportion of instantiations served as the dependent variables
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(DVs) in a 2(Age) ? 2(Repeated Condition) Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA).
Age was found to be significant, Wilks' ? = .817, F(2,76) = 8.505,;? < .001, ??2 = .183, while
repeated condition was not, Wilks' ? = .985, F(2,76) = .569, ? = ..568, ??2 = .015. The
interaction was also not significant, Wilks' ? = .964, F(2,76) = . 1.399, ? = ..253, ??2 = .036.
Given the significance of the overall MANOVA test for age, a univariate main effect of age was
examined and was obtained for total proportion of instantiations, F(1,77) =l7,p< .001, ??2 =
.181; older children (M= .47, SD = .19) mentioned more instantiations than did younger children
(M= .32, SD = .14). Older and younger children did not differ significantly on total proportion of
items, F(I, 77) = .252, ? =ns, ?„2 = .003.
Instantiations. For the narrative portion of the interview, proportions of each
instantiation type were computed. The number offixed and variable instantiations the child
mentioned were divided by the total number ??fixed and variable instantiations in each
occurrence (there were 6) to yield the two proportion scores. Proportions of new instantiations
were similarly computed except that the number of new instantiations mentioned was divided by
2 (as there were 2 new instantiations in each occurrence). The proportions offixed, variable, and
new instantiations served as DVs in a 2(Age) ? 2(Repeated Condition) MANOVA. The analysis
revealed significant effects of age, Wilks' ? = .800, F(3,75) = 6.251,/? = .001, ??2 = .200, and
repeated condition, Wilks' ? = .870, F(3,75) = 3.743, ? = .015, ??2 = .130. While it approached
it, the interaction did not reach statistically acceptable levels of significance, Wilks' ? = .083,
F(3,75) = 2.277, ? = .087, ??2 = .083.
Univariate tests on the age main effect revealed that older children (M = .51, SD = .21)
mentioned morefixed instantiations than younger children (M= .33, SD = .22), F(XJl) = 13.31,
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? < .001, ??2 = .147. Further, as was predicted by Hypothesis 2, older children (M = .50, SD =
.28) also mentioned more variable instantiations than younger children (M= .32, SD = .19),
F(1,77) = 1 1.62, ? = .001, ??2 = .131. Surprisingly, there were no age effects with proportions of
new instantiations, F(1,77) = .135,/? = ns, ??2 = .002. This does not lend support to Hypothesis 3:
that older children would mention more new instantiations than younger children.
Univariate tests on repeated condition demonstrated that the children in the 4-session
group (M= .49, SD = .25) mentioned a greater number offixed instantiations than those in the 2-
session group (M= .33, SD = .22), F(l,77) = 6.94, ? = .010, ??2 = .083. Contrary to Hypothesis
5, the children in the 2-session group (M= .35, SD = .32) actually mentioned more new
instantiations than those in the 4-session group (M= .21, SD = .39), F(IJl) = 4.381,/» = .040,
?? = .054. Hypothesis 4 predicted that those in the 4 session condition would mention more
variable instantiations; there were no repeated condition differences in proportions ?? variable
instantiations, F(1,77) = .189,/» = ns, ??2= .002
While the interaction component of the MANOVA did not quite reach significance,
Wilks' ? = .083, F(3,75) = 2.277, ? = .087, ??2 = .083, the means of the proportions of new
instantiations mentioned by age and repeated condition (refer to Table 5 for the means) suggest
that while the older children remained fairly consistent with the rate of reporting new
instantiations between 2 and 4 sessions, the younger children's means for reporting these
decreased from 2 sessions to 4.
Summary. In sum, there were robust age differences in the kinds of instantiations
children reported in their narratives. Overall, older children reported more instantiations total
than younger children. More specifically, older children also reported greater proportions offixed
37
and variable instantiations than did the younger children, thus lending support for Hypothesis 2.
Further, the 2-session group reported more new instantiations than the 4-session group.
Accuracy
Narrative. For the narrative (free-recall) portion of the interview, proportional accuracy
scores were computed by dividing the number of accurate reported instantiations of each
frequency type by the total number of target instantiations mentioned ofthat frequency type,
yielding proportional accuracy scores forfixed, variable and new instantiations for the narrative
section. Accuracy referred to whether the mentioned details were present in the occurrence that
the children identified.
Fixed instantiations. All of the children that mentionedfixed instantiations in their
narrative were accurate in their attributions. Note that this is not an empirical finding but rather a
reflection on how the data were coded. Fixed instantiations were present in every occurrence,
and thus, if a child mentioned a detail of this type, they were automatically accurate. Table 6
presents the means of proportions of accurate responses for each item frequency type by age and
repeated condition.
Variable instantiations. A 2(Age) ? 2(Repeated Condition) univariate ANOVA on the
proportion of accurate attributions for variable instantiations revealed a significant main effect of
age. As predicted by Hypothesis 2, older children (M= .61, SD = .35) were more accurate than
younger children (M= .43, SD = .41), F(1,74) = 5.84, ? = .018, ??2 = .073. Repeated condition
was also significant, albeit in the opposite direction than was predicted in Hypothesis 4; the 2-
session children (M= .68, SD = .38) were more accurate than 4-session children (M= .35, SD =
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.33), F(l,74) = 17.15,/» < .001, ?? = .188. The interaction component was not significant,
F(1,74) = .495,/? = ns, ??2 = .007.
New instantiations. A univariate ANOVA on the proportion of accurate new
instantiations mentioned was not possible due to the small number of 4-to-5-year-old children in
the 4-session group that mentioned a new instantiation in their narrative. Of the four children in
this group that mentioned a new instantiation, three of them were accurate in their attribution.
Conversely, there were 15 4-to-5-year-olds in the 2-session condition that mentioned new
instantiations in their narrative, and 12 of them were accurate in their attributions. A Chi-square
analysis on the number of 4-to-5-year-olds who mentioned a new instantiation in their narrative
revealed no difference in accuracy depending on whether children participated 2 or 4 times, ?2(1,
N= 19) = .048,/? = .827. The Chi-square for the 7-to-8-year-olds that mentioned new
instantiations in their narrative also revealed no difference in accuracy, depending on whether
children participated in 2 or 4 sessions, ? (2, N= 21) = 1.175,/? = ns.
Summary. On the whole, the children who did mention instantiations in their free
narratives were accurate regardless of whether they mentionedfixed or new instantiations.
Variable instantiations were fairly often recalled by children and older children recalled them
more accurately than younger children. Further, the 2-session children were more accurate with
variable details than the children in the 4-session condition.
Specific questions. The proportions of accurate, inaccurate, and DK responses to the
specific questions were computed separately for each item frequency type. Proportions offixed
accurate, fixed inaccurate, fixed DK, variable accurate, variable inaccurate, variable DK, new
accurate, new inaccurate, new DK were used as DVs in a 2(Age) x 2(Repeated Condition)
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MANOVA. Analysis revealed significant main effects of age, Wilks' ? = .683, F(9,69) = 3.558,
? = .001, ??2 = .317, and repeated condition, Wilks' ? = .515, F(9,69) = 7.210, ? < .001, ??2 =
.485. The interaction component was not significant, Wilks' ? = .861, F(9,69) = 1.236, ? = .288,
r|p = .139. This non significant finding term dismisses Hypotheses 7 and 8, as there are no
significant interactions.
Univariate tests on the effect of age revealed that older children (M= .88, SD = .13) were
more accurate in attributingy/xec/ instantiations to the correct occurrence than younger children
(M= .72, SD = .24), F(1,77) = 14.51, ? < .001, ??2 = .159. The 7-to-8-year-old children (M=
.44, SD = .26) were also more accurate at attributing variable instantiations to the correct
occurrence than were the 4-to-5 -year-olds (M= .26, SD = .23), F(IJl) = \A2\,p < .001, ??2 =
.156, as was originally predicted by Hypothesis 2. Further, the younger children (M= .46, SD =
.25) were also significantly more inaccurate than older children with variable instantiations (M=
.35, SD = .23), F(1,77) = 5.496, ? = .022, ??2 = .067. While no predictions were made about DK
responses, it was found that younger children (M= .15,SD = .21) were more likely to give a DK
response to a specific question about a.fixed instantiation than older children (M= .05, SD = .10),
F(1,77) = 6.72, ? = .01 1, ??2 = .080. Younger children (M= .18, SD = .19) were also
significantly more likely to give DK responses to questions about variable instantiations than
older children (M= .10, SD = .12), F(1,77) = 4.99, ? = .028, ??2 = .061. Surprisingly, there were
no age differences in children's proportions of accurate, F(XJl) = .025, ? = ns, ??2 < .001,
inaccurate, F(l,77) = .175,/? = ns, ??2= .002, or DK, F(l,77) = .331, ? = ns, ??2= .004, responses
to new instantiations (contrary to Hypothesis 3; refer to table 4 for a list of hypotheses and
whether they were supported).
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The univariate tests on repeated condition revealed, in contrast to the predictions of
Hypothesis 5, the 2-session children (M = .29, SD = .20) were more accurate regarding new
instantiations than the 4-session children (M= .1 1, SD = .1 1), F(1,77) = 22. 18, ? < .001, ??2 =
.224. Surprisingly, the children in the 2-session group (M= .44, SD = .25) were also more
accurate with variable instantiations than those in the 4-session group (M= .25, SD = .23),
F(l,77) = 14.45, ? < .001, ??2 = .158. Further, The 4-session group (M= .49, SD = .21) were
more inaccurate with variable instantiations than the 2-session group (M= .33, SD = .25),
F(XJl) = 10.03, ? = .002, ?? =.115. Repetition did not have an effect on proportions of
accurate, F(l,77) = 1.653,/? = ns, ??2= .021, inaccurate, F(XJl) = 2.892,/? = ns, ??2= .036, or
DK, F(l,77) = .033,/? = ns, ?? < .001, responses to questions aboutfixed instantiations.
Repeated condition also did not have an effect on proportions of DK responses to variable,
F(XJl) = 1.01,/? = ns, ??2= .013, or new, F(XJl) = .025, /? = ns, ??2<.001 instantiations.
Proportions of inaccurate responses to new instantiations did not differ by repeated condition,
F(l,77) = .001,/? = ns, ??2< .001.
Summary. Strong age effects emerged again in response to the specific questions
favouring accurate responses from the older children. The older children responded accurately to
a greater proportion of questions aboutfixed and variable (though not new) instantiations than
did younger children. Younger children also responded with more DKs to questions aboutfixed
and variable instantiations.
The amount of experience with the event mattered when answering questions about
variable and new instantiations; children were more accurate after 2-sessions than 4-sessions.
Four experiences of the event led to no greater accuracy regardingyìxed details.
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Discussion
The current study examined how age and repeated experience affected children's mental
representations of a repeated event. Children participated in a repeated event 2 or 4 times, and
the event was designed such that it included constants, variations as well as deviations in each
occurrence, just as many real life repeated events do. The study investigated a number of
different facets that may be underlying a mental representation: ability of children to encode and
recall different types of variations of a repeated event, their levels of script development, ability
to monitor sources, ability to disclose that the event occurred more than once (multiple incidents
disclosure), as well as their ability to take unique aspects and use that to help identify and label
one instance of this repeated event in their own words (with or without the help of an
interviewer). This is the first study of its kind to include a varying repeated condition, as well as
including constants, variations, and deviations in every occurrence.
One of the issues with forensic interviews of children who may have been abused
repeatedly is for the interviewer and child to come up with a name or label for the occurrence in
question. It is important that the label identifies a single occurrence, and is not ambiguous to the
child or the interviewer (Guadagno et al., 2006). It would be very useful to determine ways to
interview children better, to ensure that the child and the interviewer are speaking of the same
occurrence, and maximize the correct amount of information the child recalls. This study used
both free recall and specific questioning techniques, which are both common practices when
interviewing children in forensic settings.
Across analyses, it was evident that both age and repeated condition had an effect on
children's representations of repeated events, and the accuracy of their memories for different
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item frequency types. Next, the discussion will examine the main findings of the study,
pertaining to children's ability to disclose multiple incidents, their ability to label one specific
instance, and how accurately they reported constants (fixed items), variations (variable items),
and deviations (new items). The findings will all be discussed in reference to three main theories:
script theory (and more specifically the schema confirmation-deployment model), the source-
monitoring framework, as well as fuzzy trace theory.
Multiple Incident Disclosure
The first findings to be discussed are those on whether children spontaneously disclosed
multiple incidents. Fewer 4-to-5 -year-old children disclosed multiple incidents spontaneously
(and without the help of an interviewer) than was expected; they also needed more interviewer
prompts in order to do so. On the contrary, more 7-to-8-year-old children disclosed multiple
incidents spontaneously and needed a smaller number of interviewer prompts in order to do so.
This finding is not surprising, given older children are said to be more advanced at script
development. They confirm (notice similarities between the incidents), as well as deploy (notice
variations and deviations) their schémas faster than younger children (Farrar & Goodman, 1992;
Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 1999). With their advanced level of script development, as well as
their more advanced abilities at understanding time, temporal sequencing, and temporal language
(Friedman, 1993; Friedman & Lyon, 2005), the older children would be able to use more generic
language (e.g., 'we usually see a fox'), episodic language (e.g., 'the first day, we did '), as well
as discriminatory language (e.g., 'one time the cloak was blue, the next time it was red') than the
younger children, and indicate to the interviewer that the activities occurred more than once.
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There were no effects of repeated condition on children's ability to disclose multiple
incidents, which is slightly surprising; the schema confirmation-deployment model would predict
that at least the children in the 4-session condition would be further along in script development
than the 2-session condition and would be more likely to use terms such as: 'usually/always/the
first time', and therefore disclose multiple incidents spontaneously on their own. Increased
experience with the event did not seem to help children in identifying that the LA occurred more
than once, while an increase in age did have an effect on this ability. Perhaps with increased
experience with the event, the tendency to lean towards a scripted representation made it so that
they were speaking in present tense terms such as 'we do puzzles, she wears a red, and green
cloak, and we see a fox.' This type of language is not indicative of having an episodic
representation; perhaps the 2 session children were the opposite; since they had only experienced
the events twice, and their scripted representations would not be as strong, they could be
representing these events as two separate and non-related, independent incidents. They would
then use less present tense and general language (as they would not be falling into a script
mentality), but they also would not be using episodic language (e.g., 'we did this the first time')
as the events were still fairly unrelated to these children. Thus, no difference would be found
between the groups. Next, the discussion will focus on the data regarding children's ability to
nominate their own label for one occurrence of the repeated event.
Labelling
While there were many children in both age groups and repeated conditions that did label
on their own, contrary to initial predictions, there were no significant effects on who was more
likely to label (child or interviewer), the section of narrative the labelling occurred, or the
number of interviewer prompts needed to label that were dependent on age or increased
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experience. At least, it could be predicted (especially with the findings of multiple disclosure of
incidents in the current study) that older children (and those in the 4 session condition) would be
more likely to label the target instance on their own, without the interviewer's help. The schema
confirmation-deployment model would pit these children to be further into (or have passed
through) deployment (Farrar & Goodman, 1992; Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 1999); they should
be capable of encoding and later recalling variations and deviations in each different session, and
later using these unique features in order to label the occurrence, without the help of the
interviewer.
Older children are also more proficient with use of temporal language, as well as
language and its structure in general (Friedman & Lyon, 2005), which would make them more
likely to use temporal labels than younger children. They also have longer lasting verbatim
traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998; 2004), better source monitoring abilities (Lindsay et al., 1991),
as well as an increased ability at binding their sources into a more cohesive representation
(Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Sluzenski et al., 2006) than younger children. Since the older
children's traces of the different details in the event are said to be longer lasting, their ability to
distinguish between the occurrences and bind the different features of each occurrence into a
more substantial representation of each occurrence are also thought to be more advanced than
those of younger children; it is somewhat surprising that the older children were not better than
younger children at identifying a unique label on their own. For excerpts from interviews with an
8-year-old at the labelling phase and a 4-year-old in the same phase, refer to Appendices E and
F, respectively.
It is not as though the older children did not have better knowledge of constants as well
as variations than younger children; they did, as evidenced by their ability to mention more fixed
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details in their narrative, as well as being more accurate with variable details. Older children
showed better performance on these facets, and yet could not use them in order to identify their
own unique label more so than younger children. Perhaps a difference could have been noted if a
slightly older age group was used (ages 9 and 10), as these children would be more advanced
with using language. It could also be argued that this study's label funnel was helping the
younger children so much that they were actually on par with the older children at identifying a
unique label.
Often, children's labels would be: 'the funnest time at the LA'; while this label could
work and be very unique to the child (one of the times was much more fun than the others), it is
entirely ambiguous to the interviewer. Some label funnel questions were slightly repetitive
(Refer to Appendix D for the interview protocol), and perhaps after children were told that their
label was 'good, but let's try and give it another name' a couple of times, they may have gotten
discouraged. Implicitly telling the children what an example of a good label would be (e.g., 'a
good name would be something that only happened one time'), may have also increased the
children's ability to identify their own label. Perhaps children need to be trained on how to better
pay attention to unique details in order to later use them as a discriminatory feature.
Attempts were made to analyze the types of labels used by the children and whether any
of these were related to age or repeated experience. For children who labelled, no significant
differences were found for type of label (temporal or instantiation level). There were also no
significant primacy and recency preferences across the groups. While it is a positive aspect to
have interviewers that are not blind, and thus have the ability to label for the child if the child is
incapable (in order to not lose any data), it may also take something away from the data; since
every child eventually identified their own or was given a unique label, all of the labels ended up
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unique (to the researcher perhaps, not the child in all cases). It would be interesting to conduct a
labelling training study where in one condition the interviewers were completely blind as to what
the child experienced, and used the child's first label (whatever that may be) without using any
of the label runnel questions, and to compare it with a label funnelling condition, in order to test
whether this funnel aided children. Next, the discussion will focus on the children's ability to
recall constant, unvarying details of the event.
Recall of constants
Older children mentioned more and were more accurate with fixed instantiations than
younger children. Younger children, on the other hand, were more likely to give a DK response
to fixed instantiations than older children were. Interestingly, increasing experience did not have
an effect on accuracy for fixed instantiations, but it did have an effect on the number offixed
details mentioned in the narrative; 4 session children mentioned more fixed details in their
narrative. Initially we had predicted no age or repeated condition differences, as it was assumed
that all children would be performing at ceiling for these details; they were present in every
occurrence in the exact same form, and the children did not have any other exemplars to confuse
them (as would be the case with variable details). This prediction was only true when examining
the focused questions data. With only 2 experiences with an event, a child may not have a solid
scripted representation, at least not enough to mention these generic constants spontaneously,
whereas a child with multiple experience with the same object, and a more advanced script
representation of the event, would probably be able recall it on their own (it did happen 4 times)
than a 2 session child. However, when the 2 session child is asked specifically "which animal did
she introduce you to at the LA?" it is highly likely that a child with less experience would be
able to recall it, simply with the question as a prompt; ? only saw one animal, and it was the
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same both times. It was a fox'. Thus, why 2 and 4 session children differ on reporting offixed
instantiations spontaneously in narrative, but do not differ when specifically asked.
Consistent with script theory (Hudson, 1990; Hudson et al., 1992); older children and
those with more experience with an event are able to recall details that are common to all of the
occurrences as they become a part of the general event representation. According to the schema
confirmation-deployment model (Farrar & Goodman, 1992; Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 1999),
the first types of details to be remembered would be constant details, as this occurs during the
first phase of the model: script confirmation. The older children go through this phase faster than
younger children do, and those in the 4-session condition would have at least passed through this
confirmation phase and would move into deploying their schema, thus they also would be better
at spontaneously disclosing details which remained constant.
Further, fuzzy trace theory would support this pattern of results; repetition leads to strong
traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 2004), and verbatim traces of a fixed detail grow strong with
repetition (Roberts & Powell, 2007). Verbatim traces for afixed detail that is present in the same
form, every time, would be stronger after 4 sessions, than after 2 sessions, and older children,
whose verbatim traces last longer than those of younger children, would be more proficient at
recall of these details than younger children.
Source confusion would not be an issue with fixed details as they are always the same;
seeing the exact same detail on four different occasions is bound to make this detail well
encoded. It would be easy to retrieve as there is no need for source confusions. The more times
one sees the same detail, the more likely it is to be recalled spontaneously at a later date. Again,
with the nature of the specific question prompt, seeing the same thing two or four times did not
matter when it came to accuracy, but did when it came to the number oífixed details that the
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child spontaneously disclosed. As older children are better at monitoring sources, and are less
likely to have source amnesia than younger children (Drummey & Newcombe, 2003), this
pattern of results is also supported by the source-monitoring framework. Next, the discussion
will shift to how the current sample of children recalled details that varied in the scripted event.
Recall of variations
As was predicted, older children mentioned more variable instantiations, and were more
accurate (in free recall and specific questions) when recalling these details than younger children
were (Hypothesis 2 was supported). The younger children were also more likely to give a DK
response to variable instantiations than the older children were. As the schema confirmation-
deployment model would predict, older children moved into schema deployment faster than
younger children, and were thus more likely to encode variations in an occurrence, because they
no longer had to attend to the constant/unvarying details, as they had already confirmed their
schema for the general event representation (Farrar & Goodman, 1992; Farrar & Boyer-
Pennington, 1999). Further evidence of this is that younger children were saying DK more to
these varying details; it could be stated that they may have not encoded them at all, or if they had
encoded them (e.g., they know they saw a red, green, blue and yellow cloak), they did not yet
have the ability to ascertain which occurrence each colour of cloak was from. The schema
confirmation-deployment model does not make predictions or explanations as to why children
make these errors (failure at encoding, or an issue with monitoring the sources at retrieval).
Additionally, older children have longer lasting verbatim traces (Brainerd & Reyna,
1998; 2004) than younger children, according to fuzzy trace theory. They also do not have as
strong of a reliance on gist traces as younger children do; errors in recalling details that vary,
according to fuzzy trace theory, arise due to a strong reliance on gist representations. A gist trace
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may be likened to a script of the event as a whole (e.g., 'we go into that room, she tells us her
name, and then she puts on a cloak, and then we do some magnets and puzzles'); a gist
representation could be likened to an item level representation (e.g., for the cloak variable item,
it would be that the leader wears a different coloured cloak); this item level representation holds
slots for a number of gist consistent verbatim details (target's exact form: the red, green, yellow,
and blue cloaks). Since repetition strengthens the gist representations of variable details (Roberts
& Powell, 2007), errors occur because children recall incorrect verbatim traces due to a strong
gist representation (which holds a number of inconsistent verbatim details of the cloak). Thus
children may be quite likely to falsely recall that it was the blue/red/green cloak when it was
really yellow. With their verbatim traces fading more quickly than those of older children, their
propensity to rely on their gist representations, their decreased ability to monitor (Johnson et al.,
1993; Lindsay et al., 1991) and bind their sources (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Sluzenski et
al., 2006), it is no surprise that younger children fared worse with the variable details.
Very surprisingly, the 2-session condition was more accurate with variable details (in
free recall, as well as specific questioning) than the 4-session condition (the opposite of the
prediction of Hypothesis 4; for a list of hypotheses, refer to Table 4). This finding is in
contention with the schema confirmation-deployment model; those with increased experience
should be more accurate than children with less experience because they should have confirmed
their schémas, and have moved into deployment, where their attention would be focused on
noticing details that vary within the script (Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 1999). Instead, the added
experience made the children more confused about varying details.
Further, the model suggests that an interaction would exist between age and repeated
condition for accuracy of variable instantiations such that, older children are better/faster at
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getting through schema-confirmation, and should be performing much better than younger
children at 2 sessions, but this difference should become attenuated by the fourth session (as the
younger children start to move further into script development). Contrary to this hypothesis (#7),
younger children were not improving, but progressively getting worse with increasing experience
with a variable instantiation; the older children were not faring that much better at the fourth
session. While older children may have longer lasting verbatim traces, and a better ability to
monitor sources, this still does not overshadow the confusion that is brought on by more
experience with such similar, albeit varying sources which are gist-consistent verbatim traces
(such as a cloak that changes colour). Both fuzzy trace and the source monitoring framework
make better predictions as to why that interaction did not occur.
On the contrary, the source monitoring framework would predict that the 2-session
children would be better at recalling variable details than those in the 4-session condition; with
more sources, especially sources that are similar, the more confusion that would arise (Roberts &
Blades, 1999). In this case, the fewer options children have available to them, the better it is for
their recall, and this was supported by the current study's findings (but contrary to initial
predictions).
Fuzzy-Trace would also predict this pattern of findings about the variable details; with
more experience (4 sessions) with a highly similar object (a cloak that always changes colour),
gist representations would be stronger, and thus, a gist-consistent, incorrect verbatim detail is
likely to be recalled. Whereas with only 2 sessions, gist representations of the cloak item may not
be as strong, and thus, the children would not get as confused between the two different variable
details. Next to be discussed are the findings relevant to how children recalled unique features, or
atypical deviations from the scripted event.
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Recall of novel features
The 2-session children mentioned more new instantiations, and were more accurate when
asked specific questions about the new instantiations than 4-session children. This finding was
not as originally predicted (and is the opposite of Hypothesis 6). According to the schema
confirmation-deployment model, those with more experience should be entering (or passing
through) schema-deployment; noticing and recalling deviations correctly compared to those with
less experience (Farrar & Goodman, 1992; Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 1999). Instead, the
children in this sample were recalling more new instantiations after 2-sessions, and were more
accurate when specifically asked about them, just as they were with the variable instantiations. It
seems as though the increased experience led children to lose these unique features into their
general event representation. They chose to recall more constant details instead (as can be
evidenced by the finding that 4-session children mentioned more fixed instantiations in their
narratives than 2-session children).
Interestingly, 4-to-5-year old children in the 2 session condition had fairly comparative
means to the 7-to-8-year olds (refer to Table 5 for means of the proportions of total new
instantiations mentioned). The younger children were probably guessing that these unique details
were part of the occurrence they chose to mention (they only had a possible four different unique
features to mention; 2 being from the target occurrence), and not due to a more advanced ability
of encoding or retrieval. By the fourth session, they had eight different exemplars of unique
details to choose from, and their mean for mentioning these decreased. As with the variable
instantiations, the children became more confused between all of the different exemplars of the
new instantiations in the 4-session condition (e.g., 'we did 8 different new things, I can't
remember which one was on the third day'). They were not as likely to mention these details in
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the 4-session condition, and this was especially evident in the younger age group. The 7-to-8-
year olds' means of proportions of total new instantiations remained fairly constant (and even
increased slightly between 2 and 4 sessions). While the 7-to-8-year-olds were not helped by
repetition per se (their mean remained fairly constant), the 4-to-5 -year-olds actually seemed to do
worse with increasing experience.
Additionally, while the free- recall data for the new instantiations could not be analyzed
for accuracy due to children not mentioning very many new instantiations in their narrative, the
author points to the numbers of children that did mention new instantiations and how they vary
with age and increasing experience with the event; while very few 4-to-5-year-olds in the 4-
session group even mentioned a new instantiation in their narrative (there were only four; three
were accurate), there were 15 4-to-5 -year-olds in the 2-session group that mentioned a new
instantiation (12 were accurate). The number of 7-to-8-year olds who mentioned a new
instantiation in their free recall stayed fairly consistent across repeated condition (10 in the 2-
session condition and 1 1 in the 4-session condition).
The source monitoring framework would predict that unique, more salient information
may be better recalled than something familiar or varying; source decisions are based on the
amount and vividness of perceptual detail recalled during remembering (Lindsay et al., 1991),
and something unique or atypical (such as a new instantiation) may be more vivid than routine,
albeit varying aspects {variable instantiations) and thus, be more often and more accurately
recalled. After 2 sessions, the children have experienced 4 unique features {new instantiations)
and these may be vivid or different enough to be recalled fairly correctly, but by 4 sessions, they
now have 8 different unique features {new instantiations) to choose from, and are confused by all
of the options. It is evident that this is not an encoding issue; new details are being encoded by
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children (as evidenced by the 2 session children's ability to recall them accurately), but by the
4th session, it seems that they have too many exemplars to choose from and cannot be sure
which one happened when; they fail to disclose these details in their narrative and attribute them
to the wrong occurrence when specifically asked.
Fuzzy-trace theory would predict that children would not remember these unique features
very well at all, due to a lack of repetition of them. The theory states children have poorer
verbatim traces of details only encountered once (Brainerd & Reyna, 2004). Therefore, since
these unique features are only encountered once, repetition would not be a factor which aided the
children in recalling these new details later. Fuzzy trace would predict though that at least, the
older children would be significantly more accurate with unique details, as their verbatim traces
last longer. This notion was also not supported by the present sample.
Further, unlike would be predicted by the schema-confirmation deployment model, and
this study (Hypothesis 6), the interaction that there would be a much larger difference between
the age groups at 2 sessions than at 4, due to the older children confirming their schémas faster,
entering deployment, and encoding atypical deviations (new instantiations), they would be much
more accurate than younger children at 2 sessions; this difference would decrease by 4 sessions,
as the younger children should at least be entering deployment by the fourth session. This
interaction was not supported, and this refutes findings of Boyer-Bennington (1999), where they
posited that increasing experience (and simplifying the event) was enough to get even 4-year old
children to recall atypical deviations. This study found no such effects. Perhaps more than 4
sessions are needed in order to fully confirm and deploy a schema for a scripted event.
In sum, younger (and older children somewhat) were not aided by repetition; they were not
getting better at noticing deviations (atypical-«ew and typical-van'aô/e), they were actually
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getting worse with increased experience as these unique new features were absorbed into their
general event representation, and were not being recalled by the fourth session.
Summary
Overall, older children were more skilled at spontaneously disclosing multiple incidents,
mentioning more fixed and variable details in their narrative than younger children. Older
children were also more accurate with variable details than their younger counterparts; younger
children were more likely to give a DK response to fixed and variable instantiations. No age or
repeated condition effects emerged for children's ability to label a specific instance. Repeated
condition effects were evident in recall of variable and new instantiations with the 2-session
children faring much better than those with more experience.
Evaluation of Theories
In general, script/schema theories are effective in their predictions of how children recall
general, scripted details and constants (fixed instantiations), and how increasing experience and
age helps accuracy for these details. However, most of the predictions according to the schema
confirmation-deployment model and Farrar and Boyer-Pennington's (1999) study about varying
and new features were not supported by the current sample. While an age effect was supported
by the data for variable instantiations, the predictions about increasing experience were not
supported. Children were not helped by increasing experience (as the model would predict);
while more experience helped with more reporting offixed details, it was actually a detriment to
children's recall ?? variable and new details.
Further, the schema confirmation-deployment model does not make clear or accurate
predictions as to why children make the errors that they do. The model would argue that children
completely overlooked variable and deviating details in the 2-session condition because they
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were still confirming their script, and needed to pay attention to predictable (fixed details). This
was not supported, as the children were clearly encoding these details as evidenced by their
increased accuracy for the new and variable details at 2-sessions (vs. 4-sessions). Thus, it can be
argued that the model's notions of deployment of the schema are not quite accurate (at least not
in the current sample); rather, children do allocate their attention and encode varying or unique
details as well as constant details even after only 2 sessions; by 4 sessions they have too many
options to choose from, and are incapable of tying them to the correct occurrence, which is why
we evidenced the amount and accuracy differences between the repeated conditions. Further, it
could be that children need longer than 4 sessions to fully develop a script. In sum, schema/script
theories make accurate predictions when examining general, scripted, and constant details, but
falter with predictions about varying and unique features. Next, the discussion will advance to
the theories that made better predictions pertaining to the current study's findings: fuzzy trace
theory and the source monitoring framework.
Fuzzy trace theory posits that as repetition with fixed details increases, so do verbatim
traces of those details, and since older children have longer lasting verbatim traces than younger
children (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998; 2004), it is not surprising that older were better at recalling
these details. Additionally, fuzzy trace's predictions about why children make the errors they do,
specifically about variable details were supported; with more experience with a varying detail,
gist representations grew stronger and since errors are said to occur due to a strong reliance on
gist representations (and younger children rely on gist traces more so than older children), older
children and those with less experience were better with recall of variable details than younger
and 4-session children (as was supported by the current study).
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Whereas fuzzy trace has well defined and supported concepts about fixed and variable
details, the predictions of unique or new details were not supported; the prediction about these
items would be that they would not be well recalled by children at all due to a lack of repetition.
With less repetition, verbatim traces and gist representations would not be strong, and thus recall
would be poor; but children did recall these unique details and quite accurately when they did so,
(as can be noted by their free recall data). Further, if anything, older children should be better at
recalling these new details simply because their verbatim traces last longer and this was not
supported. In sum, most of the concepts that fuzzy trace theory would predict were supported,
besides those about unique features and their recall. Subsequently, the source monitoring
framework predictions about all of the different item types were supported, including those about
unique, new details, and will be summarized next.
The source monitoring framework made the most successful predictions about all of the
item types; with fixed details, there was less of a need to monitor sources, as the source was
always the same; with more experience with exact same details, the memory for the content of
these details would become even stronger, and they would be recalled more often by children
(though not necessarily more accurately). With similar items that vary in some form every time
(variable instantiations), the fewer options or sources that one has available in memory, the more
accurate recall would be, as was supported by 2-session children being better at variable
instantiation recall than 4-session children. Older children are more capable of monitoring their
sources than younger children are, and this was also supported by the data; older children were
better at variable instantiation recall than younger children.
Where the schema confirmation-model and fuzzy trace's predictions about new details
were not supported, the source monitoring framework can explain the results better; new items
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may be better recalled than varying details because they were unique and thus, more salient in
memory. They were also less well recalled after increasing experience with an event, as the
children had more different new features/sources to recall, and thus were less accurate after 4
sessions than after 2. Thus, the source monitoring framework made the most accurate predictions
and explanations about how age and repeated experience affected children's ability to recall
different types of details of one occurrence of a repeated event. The discussion will now consider
the limitations of the present study.
Limitations
An issue to be noted with the study's design is the small number of new items in each
occurrence (there were only two), whereas there were six each oífixed and variable. While all of
the analyses were conducted in proportions, it would be more beneficial to include the same
number of new instantiations as there are fixed and variable in each occurrence. Unfortunately,
this was not possible in this study, as the events would have had to be much too long, and
nutrition breaks in schools only allow for 20 minute sessions with the children.
Further, a larger sample of children in each condition may have been more beneficial, and
would have added more power to the sample, and perhaps made some of the results more robust
(especially in the case with some interactions as well as main effects which may have been
significant in the overall MANOVA given more participants). While, originally we had expected
to have 12 children per cell, this was not possible due to the number of interviews that had to be
excluded, as well as a low participation rate from the school board due to timing constraints (the
study was quite a long time commitment for schools, and required participation for three
consecutive weeks).
58
Furthermore, some of the label runnel questions were repetitive in nature, as this was a
completely exploratory route. The repeated questions in the funnel may not have been
completely useful; children may have not wanted to give another response to a question they had
already answered, or they may have been discouraged and not willing to try again. An
explanation of why their answer was not the correct one, or an explicit explanation of what a
good label would be may have aided this aspect of the interview, as well as including a non label
funnel condition for comparison purposes.
Another issue to be noted is that the children in this study were not maltreated or abused and
thus, their memories and recall may be much different than children who have been abused or
maltreated; traumatic events are likely remembered differently than a fun interactive event. Also,
within this forensic realm, it is not likely that the interview delay would be 5-to-7- days after the
last time the events took place. Memory may change over longer periods of time. Thus, caution
should be used when generalizing to this population.
Implications and Future Directions
One of the strengths of this study is that we were able to ask children about the time they
remembered best. Due to the number of unique variations and deviations that were present in
each occurrence of the series, there was no need to rely on the assumption that children would
remember one specific deviation episode provided by the interviewer, as previous research has
done (Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 1999; Farrar & Goodman, 1993; Powel et al., 1999; Powell &
Thomson, 1996). Further, we incorporated a labelling funnel of sorts in order to help children
identify their own label; while age or repetition condition differences were not obtained in the
findings, at least there were both older and younger children in each condition that were capable
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of identifying their own label. Further, this design more closely resembled the reality of many
abuse situations; that is, abuse is often repeated, and includes many variations or deviations, as
well as constants. This study was the first of its kind to include a varying age group, varying
experience with similar (albeit varying) event, and which included constants, variations, as well
as deviations in each occurrence of the event.
The study also furthers knowledge in the field of repeated event memory, as the findings
indicated robust age and repetition condition differences in how children recall one instance of a
repeated event. This study examined three different theories of memory development in children:
script theory, the source-monitoring framework, as well as fuzzy-trace theory. There has been a
number of conflicting studies on the developmental nature of children's source monitoring
ability as well as script development. Some research has supported a developmental pattern; that
is, younger children's general script representation may be underdeveloped as compared to older
children (Farrar & Goodman, 1990, 1992). Other research has found no age differences in
children's ability to rely on general event representations (Hudson, 1990; Hudson & Nelson,
1986). This study found that age and repetition differences in how children represent a scripted
event, and that increasing experience helps with constant details, but is detrimental to recall of
variations and deviations. Older children have a better ability to spontaneously disclose multiple
incidents, as well as a better ability to recall constants and variations, but not necessarily
deviations.
Further, fuzzy trace theory has been very difficult to implicate in repeated event studies
in the past, as most of the methods (such as word lists) used in fuzzy trace-theory design have
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proven too complex to recreate into a repeated activity format. Nonetheless, the present research
addressed how the research findings fit within a fuzzy-trace perspective.
While this study found some support for the predictions of script theories, the schema
confirmation-deployment model as well as fuzzy trace, the study confirmed that those of the
source monitoring framework were the most accurate, useful, and fruitful; since the errors
children made were not due to children not encoding variable or new details, and were due to
their ability to retrieve them correctly, perhaps children could be trained to monitor their sources
better. Further research should examine whether specifically training children to monitor their
sources in a repeated event would aid in their recall of different types of details.
Another future direction to consider would be having children go through a label training
process before being asked to come up with a label for the activity; one that includes showing
children a non related video, story, or photograph, and training them how to label correctly,
using unique features or temporal information. Further, it would be interesting to recreate the
same event (with the same fixed items, more variable item exemplars, and more unique new
items), and have children participate in 1 -session, 3-session, and 6-session conditions, in order to
examine further how much event representations differ, and how increasing (or decreasing)
experience interacts with memory for different types of details, and ability to label, and whether
children need more experience than 4 sessions to develop a solid script.
Many children who give courtroom evidence are required to remember one specific
occurrence of a repeated event, and to be able to describe it with a large amount of detail.
Children may be asked to remember temporal details of an incidence of abuse, such as the date,
time, or when the incidence occurred in relation to other events, as well as many contextual
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details of the abuse such as where the incident occurred, what the perpetrator was wearing, or the
specific activities performed by the perpetrator (Brennan & Brennan, as cited in Roberts &
Powell, 2001). This is done to provide the defendant with an opportunity to come up with an
alibi, make it a chargeable offense, and determine the appropriate punishment if found guilty
(Powell et al., 2007). If the child can recall many details about the alleged abuse but confuses
the time and place, the defendant may be able to come up with an alibi, and thus be acquitted of
the charges (Roberts & Powell, 2001). Of importance then, is further study of effective and
viable methods, which may assist children in identifying one specific incidence of repeated
experience, with a sufficient amount of relevant detail.
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Table 1
Item Frequency Type Examples
Item
Frequency Definition
Typ«
Fixed
Variable
Constant:
part of
script
Variation
or typical
detail: part
of script
but
changes at
every
occurrence
Item
Animal
Cloak
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4
New
Magnets
Atypical
deviation:
not part of
script:
only
occurs
once
throughout Badge
series:
unique
Count
Objects
Bookmark
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Table 2
Participant Gender and Mean Age Information (in months) by Age Group, Repeated Condition,
and Item Set (Group 1 and Group 2).
Repeated Condition
2-session 4-session
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
MFMF MFMF
4-5
Total Total
6 5 3 7 ? Mage SD Age Range 6 3 5 5 « Mage SD Age Range
7-8
21 61.46 6.26 52.53-71.97 19 59.01 6.36 50.23-71.37
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
MFMF Total MFMF Total
? Mage SD Age Range ? Mage SD Age Range
4 5 5 6 6 4 6 5
20 98.69 8.11 84.70-108 21 98.79 7.87 84.63-108
Note: Age is reported in months
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Table 3
Examples ofHypothetical Child Utterances, and Corresponding Codes Used in Free Recall, and
Specific Question Phases
Item Types True First
Occurrence
Items
Child- Free Free Recall Child- Specific Specific
Recall Phase Code Question Phase Question Code
Fixed Fox 'We saw a
fox"
Accurate
(fixed); they
did see the fox
"I don't
remember the
stuffed animal
or what it was"
Don't know;
the child does
not remember
what the
stuffed animal
was, or they
won't say
Variable Blue cloak "We had a
green cloak
that day"
Internal
intrusion error;
inaccurate
(variable); the
green cloak
was on the 3d
day
'The cloak was
blue the first
time"
Accurate; the
cloak was blue
in the first
occurrence
New Airport
Magnets
"We played
with Barbie
magnets"
External 'We made a Other error; the
intrusion error; clown picture
children never
played with
Barbie magnets
in any
occurrence of
the event
with the
magnets"
child is
confusing this
item with
something else
they did in the
event, which
was a clown
puzzle
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Table 4
List ofHypotheses, Whether They Were Supported, and the Theoryfor Basis
Hypothesis Prediction Supported Theory Behind Hypothesis
Older > younger: identifying own label No, ns Schema confirmation-deployment
model
Older < younger: number of interviewer No, «5·
Fuzzy trace theoryprompts to reach label
The source monitoring framework
Older > younger: number oí variable details Yes Schema confirmation-deployment
model
Older > younger: accuracy for variable Yes (x 2)
Fuzzy trace theorydetails
The source monitoring framework
Older > younger: number of new details No, ns Schema confirmation-deployment
model
Older > younger: accuracy for new details No, ns
The source monitoring framework
4 sess > 2 sess: number oí variable details No, ns Schema confirmation-deployment
model
4 sess > 2 sess: accuracy for variable details No, 2 > 4
4 sess > 2 sess: number of new details No, 2 > 4 Schema confirmation-deployment
model
4 sess > 2 sess: accuracy for new details No, 2 > 4
6 New details: much bigger difference in
accuracy at 2 session between age groups
(older > younger), than at 4 sessions
7 Variable details: much bigger difference in
accuracy at 2 session between age groups
(older > younger), than at 4 sessions
No, ns Schema confirmation-deployment
mode
No, ns Schema confirmation-deployment
model
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Table 5
Means ofProportions ofNew Instantiations Reported by Age and Repeated Condition
2-session 4-session
M SD ? M SD ?
4-5 years A3 33 21 T\ 21 19
7-8 years .28 .30 20 .31 .37 21
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Table 6
Means ofProportions ofAccurate Responses in Free Recall, by Age, Repeated Condition and
Item Frequency Type
4- to 5- year olds 7- to 8- year olds
2-session 4-session 2-session 4-session
Item frequency type M SD ? M SD ? M SD ? M SD ?
Fixed 1.0 0 18 1.0 0 17 1.0 0 20 1.0 0 20
Variable .55 .43 20 .28 .34 18 .80 .29 20 .42 .31 20
New .80 .41 15 .75 .50 4 .70 .48 10 .61 .49 11
Appendix A
Counterbalancing and Target Details
Target Details
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No. Item Gl G2
Children sit on X Cardboard Blue mat Garbage bag Number Square
Cloak of leader Red Yellow Blue Green
Fox's name Boo Kip Pop Jo
Noisy animal Polar Bear Penguin Walrus Seal
Warm-up activity Wiggle fingers Touch toes jump Dance
Source of story Leader wrote Cupboard Internet Library
Content of story Dog in City Winter Party Boat
Bookmark Pink heart Black triangles Orange circles Purple squares
Utensil to note what the title of the
story is
Pencil Crayon Chalk Texta (Felt pen)
10 Puzzle Clown on
Tightrope
Clown on Bike Clown Juggling Clown in Car
Music/scene for relaxing Beach Rain Birds Kite
12 Part of body relaxed Legs Nose Stomach Arms
13 Method of getting refreshed
Fan (paper plate) Baby wipes Cool drink (water) Hand sanitizer
14 Theme of magnetic scene Airport Dinosaur Farm Construction
15 Container with stickers Box Purse Envelope Jar
16 Next stop To movie Walking a dog Birthday party Visit friend
17 Badge Jelly bean Pink feather Leaves Buttons
Type of Object Flowers Frogs Cars Tambourines
19 Put Objects Under A blanket Umbrella Pillow Case T-shirt
20 Put Objects Away In a Hat In a cookie tin In a Lunchbox In an Egg Carton
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Counterbalancing Procedure
Item Set:
In all Age ? Practice conditions, half of the children are in Group 1 and the remainder in Group
2.
Order of Administration:
Group 1 children receive the Occurrences ABCD in that order. Group 2 children receive the
Occurrences CDBA in that order.
Status of Target Items:
There are 20 target items as shown above.
6 of these 20 arefixed across the occurrences.
6 of these 20 are variable across the occurrences.
8 of these 20 are new across the occurrences, such that a new item only appears once throughout
the series, and each occurrence consists of two distinct new items.
The actual items that are assigned to fixed, variable, and new status differ for each group and are
shown below.
Group 1 Group 2
Variable 7,9,10,14,16,18 1,3,5,8,11,19
Fixed* 3 (A), 4 (B) 12 (C), 13 (D),
19(A), 20 (B)
6 (D), 7(C), 9 (B), 15 (A),
16(D), 18(C)
New* 1(A), 2(D) 5(B), 6 (C), 8
(D), 11 (B), 15(C), 17(A),
2 (B), 4 (D), 10 (C), 12(B),
13(A), 14 (D), 17(C),
20(A)
*Note: The letters in the brackets correspond to the column A, B, C, or D (from the original
target item set found in Appendix A) which indicated the instantiation to be chosen to be the
fixed (happened 4 times) or new instantiation (happened once). For instance, for item 3 (Fox's
name), the instantiation under the A column (Boo) was chosen to be the name of the fox in
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Group 1 . For Item 2 (cloak of leader), the instantiation under column D (green cloak) was chosen
to be the new item for group 2.
Items 2 (cloak) and 17 (badge) are not counterbalanced for status of item. They are administered
as a new item for both groups. This is because there is are 8 new items to the 6 variable/fixed,
and thus two of the items have to have the same new status in both groups
Appendix B
Group 1
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No. Item
Children sit on X
Typ
e
Card board
Cloak of leader Green
Fox's name Boo Boo Boo Boo
Noisy animal Penguin Penguin Penguin Penguin
Warm-up activity Touch toes
Source of story Internet
Content of story Dog in City Winter Party Boat
Bookmark Purple squares
Utensil to note what the
title of the story is
Pencil Crayon Chalk Texta (Felt pen)
10 Puzzle Clown on
Tightrope
Clown on Bike Clown Juggling Clown in Car
11 Music/scene for relaxing Rain
12 Part of body relaxed Stomach Stomach Stomach Stomach
13 Method of getting
refreshed
Hand sanitizer Hand sanitizer Hand sanitizer Hand sanitizer
14 Theme of magnetic scene Airport Dinosaur Farm Construction
15 Container with magnets Envelope
16 Next stop To movie Walking a dog Birthday party Visit friend
17 Badge Jelly bean
18 Type of Object Flowers Frogs Cars Tambourines
19 Put Objects Under A blanket A blanket A blanket A blanket
20 Put Objects Away In a cookie tin In a cookie tin In a cookie tin In a cookie tin
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Appendix C
Group 2
No. Item G2
Children sit on X Garbage bag Number Square Blue mat Cardboard
Cloak of leader Yellow
Fox's name Pop Jo Kip Boo
Noisy animal Seal
Warm-up activity jump Dance Touch toes Wiggle fingers
Source of story Library Library Library Library
Content of story Party Party Party Party
Bookmark Orange circles Purple squares Black triangles Pink heart
Utensil to note what the title
of the story is
Crayon Crayon Crayon Crayon
10 Puzzle Clown Juggling
11 Music/scene for relaxing Birds Kite Rain Beach
12 Part of body relaxed Nose
13 Method of getting refreshed Fan (paper plate)
14 Theme of magnetic scene Construction
15 Container with stickers Box Box Box Box
16 Next stop Visit friend Visit friend Visit friend Visit friend
17 Badge Leaves (artificial)
18 Type of Object Cars Cars Cars Cars
19 Put Objects Under A Pillow Case T-shirt Umbrella A blanket
20 Put Objects Away In a Hat
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Appendix D
Interview Protocol
Interview Sections
PTl: Rapport Building (5 minutes maximum)
PT2: General Recall about the LA (5 minutes max)
PT3: Occurrence Narrative (10 minutes approx. 15 minutes max)
PT4: Focus questions (5 minutes approx.)
PT5: What will happen next time? (5 minutes Max)
PT6: Closure
The interview should be 30 minutes maximum... these times are guidelines, but the maximum
times should not be exceeded.
Interview Opening: (5 minutes Maximum)
"Hi! My name is , and it's my job is to find out what children remember about
things. I heard that you did the Laurier Activities. I wasn't there when you did the Laurier
Activities and so I don't know what happened and I'd really like to hear what happened when
you did the Laurier Activities. But first I'd like to get to know you a little better. Tell me some
things about yourself.
Sample Rapport Building prompts:
Tell me about your family
Tell me more about (X)
Tell me about your friends
Tell me more about (X)
Tell me about your school
Tell me what you like to do
Tell me about the things you like to play with
Tell me about your teachers
PT 2 (General LA Recall): (5 minutes maximum)
"Now it's time to talk about the Laurier Activities. Remember, I wasn't there when you did the
Laurier Activities and it's really important that I know what happened. I need to know every
little detail, so tell me everything you remember about the Laurier Activities from the very
beginning to the very end."
Ifchild discloses multiple incidents right away, go to Page 3
Page 1
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C: Well, the first time, we had a feather badge
I: You said the first day; did the LA happen more than once?
OR
C: She always/sometimes makes a puzzle with us
I: Oh, always/sometimes? What do you mean by always/sometimes?
Child might say something like
C: Well sometimes the puzzle is different/ the puzzle is always the same
I: Oh, you said that it's sometimes different/always the same; did the LA happen more than
once?
The child has not vet disclosed MI
Give the child generalprompts about the LA, using both breadth and depth prompts as
appropriate. Breadth and depth prompts do not occur in anyparticular order, but rather are
responsive to the child's utterances.
Sample breadth prompts:
- tell me more about the LA
- tell me what else happened at the LA
What else happened?
- Tell me about the things you see at the LA?
- Tell me about the things you hear at the LA?
- What happened after that?
- Etc.
Sample depth prompts:
- Tell me more about (something mentioned by child)
What happened after she read the story
- Tell me more about the part when [something that child has mentioned] .
- Tell me everything about the part when
- Tell me every detail about the part when from the very beginning to the very
end.
What else can you tell me about
- Etc.
Ifthe child mentions the words "sometimes " or "always, " ask them what they mean, and ifthey
disclose MI, go immediately to Page 3
Page 2
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Ifthe child says "first time," "last time," "once", "onetime", "every time" etc, go immediately
to Part 3
If the child tells you a lot in 5 minutes maximum, but never discloses MI
Ask
"Ok, now did the LA happen one time or more than one time?"
IF MORE THAN ONE TIME:
"How many times did you do the LA?"
"Ok, the LA happened more than once, now what I'd like you to do is tell me all about one time,
tell me about the time you remember BEST when you did the LA. Tell me everything that
happened that time from the very beginning to the very end."
Give the childprompts about the time they remember best at the LA, using both breadth and
depth prompts as appropriate. Breadth and depth prompts do not occur in any particular order,
but rather are responsive to the child's utterances.
Move on to Page 4
Typical Encouragement Prompts
You've told me a lot about the Laurier Activities and I understand it much better now
You're being very helpful
I can see that you've been thinking hard
Thank you so much, you are helping me out a lot
Wow, you're doing a great job
Page 3
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The child has just spontaneously told you the LA happened more than once
PT3: Narrative about one of the occurrences
Always confirm
"Ok, you said one time/the first time/every time, did the LA happen one time or more than one
time?"
"How many times did you do the LA?"
Ifthe child says only one time, say "think carefully, did the LA happen one time or more than
one time " Ifthe child still says one time, ask them to tell you about the one time.
"Ok, the LA happened more than once, now what I'd like you to do is tell me all about one time,
tell me about the time you remember BEST when you did the LA. Tell me everything that
happened that time from the very beginning to the very end. I don't want you to leave anything
out"
Ifthe child is confused, say:
"You told me the LA happened X times, I'd like you to choose just one of those times to
tell me about. Tell me all about one time, from the very beginning to the very end"
LABELLING
1.) Child immediately uses label
C: My favourite time was the first/last/button badge etc. time
C: I wanna talk about the /last/button badge etc. time
I: Great, so we're gonna call this time the first/last/button badge etc. time. Now I want you to tell
me everything about the first/last/button badge etc. time from the very beginning to the very end.
2.) Child does not mention label right away but mentions items/details from the LA
Once child tells you some items/detailsfrom the LA but does not give a label. ..Say:
1 .) I: "Let's give this time, the time you remember the best a name. What do you wanna call
it?
C: My favourite Laurier Time (or something as equally non unique)
2.) I: "That's a good idea but maybe we should call it something that will tell it apart from all
of the other times"
Ifchild gives you nothing unique, say:
Page 4
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3.) I: "Let's pick out another name.
Ifchild gives you nothing unique, say
4.) I: "Let's call it something that happened only in the time you remember best"
Ifchild gives you nothing unique or is confused, say
5.) Think of something that only happened in the time you remember best
C: We got a feather badge
I: Was that different in the time you remember best than all the other times?
C: Yes... then use this as the label
C: No
Ifchild gives you nothing unique or is confused, say:
6.) I: Was there something that was different in the time you remember best?
Ifchild has not answered any ofthese questions with some sort ofunique label, then:
A) Use a variable or new instantiation the child has mentioned in the general recall
"Ok, you told me that you had a button badge, lets call this the button badge time, and tell
me everything that happened that time, from the very beginning to the very end."
OR
B.) Use a temporal label
"Ok, I want you to tell me all about the first/last time you did the LA.
After label is picked, use the standard Breadth/Depth prompts
Sample breadth prompts:
- tell me more about the (child's label) time
- tell me what else happened in the (child's label) time
What else happened?
- Tell me about the things you saw in the (child's label) time
- Tell me about the things you heard in the (child's label) time
What happened after that?
Page 5
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- Tell me more about (something mentioned by child)
What happened after she read the story
- Tell me more about the part when [something that child has mentioned].
Tell me everything about the part when
Tell me every detail about the part when from the very beginning to the very
end.
What else can you tell me about
- Etc.
Remember, you don't need to use the child's label with every prompt, but use often, as it lets
you and the child know you 're speaking about the same occurrence.
After the narrative has been exhausted, move on to focus questions.
PT 4 (Focused Questions)
Begin this stage by saying:
"Wow, you sure told me a lot about the LA. Thank you very much, you were so helpful. Now I
just have a few more questions to ask you. You might have already told me some of these things,
but I just have to make sure I understand everything, okay?"
- Skip the focused Q that corresponds to the label, ifapplicable.
Focused questions should be asked using the labelfor the time the child remembered best.
Focused Questions corresponding to the 20 target details
1. What did you sit on the time [insert child's label, e.g., you got the sticker]?
2. What colour was the leader's cloak the time [child's label]?
3. What was the fox's name the time [child's label]?
4. What noisy animal woke the fox up the time [child's label]?
5. What activity did you do to warm-up the time [child's label]?
6. I heard that the leader talked about where she got the story from. Where did she get the story
from the time [child's label]?
7. What was the story about the time [child's label]?
Page 6
84
8. What did the bookmark look like the time [child's label]?
9. What did the leader use to write the name of the story in the time [child's label]?
10. What was the puzzle about the time [child's label]?
11. What did you listen to when you relaxed in the time [child's label]?
12. What part of your body did the teacher tell you to relax in the time [child's label]?
13. What did you use to get refreshed with in the time [child's label]?
14. What picture did you make with the magnets in the time [child's label]?
15. What did you pick the magnets in the time [child's label]?
16. Where was the leader going after the LA in the time [child's label]?
17. What badge did you wear the time [child's label]?
18. What toys did you count in the time [child's label]?
19. What did the leader hide the toys under the time [child's label]?
20. What did the leader put the toys in the time [child's label]?
PT5: What will happen next time?
"Wow, you've told me a lot about what you remember about the LA, now I just have a couple
more things to ask you."
What do you think would/will happen next time you do the LA. Tell me everything you can
think ofthat might happen.
The children will more than likely list offa number ofthings immediately. Use prompts such as
Tell me about what else might happen
Tell me more about the types of things you'd do/ games you'd play the next time
Tell me about what you might see/hear the next time you do the LA
What else do you think you'd do at the LA next time?
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PT6: Closure
"You've really told me a lot about what happened when you did the Laurier Activities! Thank
you for talking to me. You were very helpful.
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Appendix E
Interview with 8-year-old
So tell me all about the time that you remember best at the Laurier Activities. Tell me everything that
happened that time from the very beginning to the very end.
The last time, we, urn the person handed out urn cardboard
Okay, so I was just asking you about the time that you remember best at the Laurier Activities and you
had mentioned the last time.
Last time we urn, went into the room that we were just in, and she gave us urn cardboard little square
cardboard squares to sit on
Okay, great.
So I got a cardboard squares to sit on so we sat on those and then she said that the little urn fox urn
pet fox, was tired and that he just wanted to go to sleep in his bed and he wanted to say hello so he
said hello to them. After, we read this book called Party Times For Two. We also got to make a
construction site with magnetics. Construction vehicles like urn, dumping trucks and stuff like that.
Oh, awesome. What did you get to do after you did the magnets at the last time?
Then we urn she said that Laurier Activities were all done and that after she was going to show us a
little dog leash
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Appendix F
Interview with 4-year-old
So tell me all about the time you remember the best. Tell me everything from the very beginning to the
very end.
Ummm ... I don't remember anymore of this stuff.
So you talked about some stories.
Umm-hmm(positive).
Oh okay. Tell me about the story from that time.
A boat.
Tell me what else happened in the time you remember best.
Um ... I liked the one about the snowman.
Oh did you? Was that from - was that from the time you remember best?
No.
No? Okay. I just want to know all about the time you remember best okay?
Ummmm - boat one, he took some stuff from the ocean.
Okay. So what we're going to have to do now ... Is we're going to have to give this time that you
remember the very best a name. Okay? So what would you like to call it?
Oh R. that does sound like a very good name. But, I think we should call it something that will help us tell
it apart from all the other times. ... So what sounds like a good name to tell it apart from all the other
times?
Ummm ... Um ... Rich?
